Wrongly Embracing Absurdities in the Name of Unknowns, and the Indubitable Nature of Semantics and Reason

(Last updated on 22/8/2021)

This post consists of four parts: “Meaningfully distinguishing between what is meaningful and what is meaningless”, “Scepticism”, “Our fallibility”, and “Meaningfully distinguishing between truth and falsehood”.

Meaningfully distinguishing between what is meaningful and what is meaningless

Suppose I said to you I saw a round square and you refused to believe me. Can I then meaningfully say to you “just because you haven’t seen round squares, doesn’t mean they don’t exist”? Further suppose I said to you that I have a tenth sense and you refused to believe me. Can I then meaningfully say to you “just because you don’t have a tenth sense, doesn’t mean such a thing is impossible”?

As far as I know, something like a tenth sense is either possible (like a unicorn or a tree) or impossible (like a square that’s triangular, or a possibility that’s impossible). Unlike a tenth sense, I know that a round square is certainly impossible. I (whoever or whatever I may be) am certainly aware of this regardless of the fact that I am not certain of who or what I really am. I can meaningfully doubt myself, but I cannot meaningfully doubt the triangularity of an actual triangle. This is what “I” am aware of. It is absurd for me to say I am unaware of that which I am aware of and vice versa.

Despite there being a clear meaningful categorical distinction between something like a tenth sense (an unknown to us) and a round square (a known absurdity), some fail to acknowledge this distinction. As a result of this, they go on to say absurd things. On one end of the spectrum you have those that will say it is absurd/impossible for you to have a tenth sense. On the other end of the spectrum you have those that will say it is possible for you to see a round square (perhaps courtesy of an evil demon). The former fail to treat unknowns as unknowns whilst the latter fail to treat absurdities as absurdities. Instead, the former treat unknowns as absurdities whilst the latter treat absurdities as unknowns. Consider the following:

1) What is the difference between “married” and “bachelor”? They both have different letter formations (hence why they are two different words). Also, they both have different meanings.

2) What is the difference between “sdnjkasdnkj” and “gngnrnjgsjnk”? They both have different letter formations. They are both meaningless to us.

3) What is the difference between “married man” and “single woman”? They both have different word formations. They both have different meanings.

4) What is the difference between “married bachelor” and “round square”? They both have different word formations. They are both absurd. Do we say they both have different meanings?

With 1, there is both a difference in how meaning is instantiated (different letter formations) and in the meaning the words generate (as in we can meaningfully distinguish between two words and two meanings). With 2, there is a difference in how meaninglessness is instantiated (different letter formations) but the meaninglessness the words generate is the same (as in we can meaningfully distinguish between two words, but not two meanings). With 4, there is a difference in how absurdity is instantiated (different meaningful word formations) but the absurdness the phrases generate is the same. If we say there is an intelligible or understandable difference between a “married bachelor” and a “round square”, then this difference is in the combination of words used to reach absurdity, not in the absurdness that the phrases generate. By this I mean a “round square” is about as understandable as a “married bachelor” (which is not understandable at all. As highlighted in 2, “sdnjkasdnkj” and “gngnrnjgsjnk” are not understandable to us at all). Contrasting 4 is the use of meaningful words to reach something meaningful (as is the case with 3).

Is there any difference between that which is meaningless (such “assdnjkasdnkj” or “ajkalg fnjadnjkf”) and that which is absurd? That which is absurd is made up of meaningful words whereas that which is meaningless is not made up of meaningful words. Despite this difference, both are meaningless. This difference may make it harder to see the meaninglessness of absurdity than it is to see the meaninglessness of pure gibberish. More importantly, it may also make the meaninglessness (or non-understandability) of one feel different to the meaninglessness of the other, despite the meaninglessness of both being the same. There is another category to consider:

5) What is the difference between ‘tenth sense’ and ‘tenth dimension’? They both have different word formations. They are both unknowns (at least to us me). Do we say they both have different meanings?

Despite being made up of different meaningful words, we cannot say they both have different meanings. We can make meaningful sense of ‘sense’ and ‘dimension’, or even ‘third sense’ and ‘third dimension’, but we cannot meaningfully make sense of ‘tenth sense’ or ‘tenth dimension’. If we cannot make meaningful sense of them, then we cannot describe them as being meaningful to us. We must therefore describe them as being meaningless to us. Absurdities, unknowns, and gibberish are all meaningless to us. We should treat all meaninglessnesses as being equally meaningless. So that which is meaningless as a result of being absurd, is no more or less meaningless than that which is meaningless to us as a result of being unknown or gibberish.

Absurdity is that which is meaningless to all and not just us. No alien or god could ever make sense of what it is to sit and stand at the same time. I do not deny that it is unknown to me whether or not they possess senses that could help them make sense of things that I cannot, but this only applies to unknowns (see 5), not absurdities (see 4). Unlike unknowns, absurdities aren’t meaningless because we don’t understand or make sense of them. They are absurd because we understand a truth and recognise that its rejection is absurd/contradictory. For example, nothing can be two different things at the same time (like a square that’s triangular). We understand this as truth, therefore, we understand round squares as absurd precisely because they reject this truth (not because they don’t make sense to us like a tenth sense).

Round squares and married bachelors are examples of easily identifiable absurdities. They consist of just two words or semantics. There are absurd philosophical arguments wherein which absurdity is not as immediately identifiable. Before looking at one such example, it is worth reiterating an obvious truth: Whenever something is identified as being absurd, it must not be treated as an unknown, it must not be treated as something meaningful, and it must not be treated as though it is nothing. It must be treated as an absurdity. To do otherwise is to be absurd/irrational or semantically inconsistent.

Since absurdity is the rejection or contradiction of truth, if there are 0 absurdities (as in if round squares are not absurd), then there are 0 truths. Pyrrhonian sceptics adopt this view but for different reasons. Some would describe Pyrrhonian scepticism as the most extreme form of scepticism. But for something to be meaningfully described as ‘the most extreme form of scepticism’, must it not be at least meaningful? Must it be not be semantically consistent?

Scepticism

Accepting Pyrrhonian scepticism as a form of scepticism, is like accepting multishapism geometry (which deals with the study of round squares and triangular pentagons) as a form of geometry. Or it would be like accepting a round square as an actual shape. It is viewing something absurd as other than absurd. I will further illustrate why Pyrrhonian scepticism is meaningfully absurd/unjustified/wrong/contradictory

Let’s label that which is always true (for example triangles having three sides) as a basic belief. The Pyrrhonian sceptic asks “If basic beliefs are justified but not by other beliefs, then how are they justified? What else besides beliefs is there that can justify beliefs?”. There can be nothing besides basic beliefs to justify beliefs. This answers the sceptic’s latter question (which I will attempt to justify in further detail). As for his former question, some respond with “our experiences”. But this is a mistake. If someone asks us “how are triangles three sided?”, we should not tell them “our experience makes triangles three sided” or that “our being makes triangles three sided”. Rather, we should tell them “it’s just the way Existence is” or “triangles are three sided because being three-sided is a necessary semantical component of triangle”. So if someone asks “how are basic beliefs justified?”, we should not tell them “our experience makes basic beliefs justified”. We should tell them “basic beliefs just are justified just as triangles just are three-sided shapes” or “it’s just the way Existence is”. The Pyrrhonian sceptic will then say that this sort of reasoning is circular. Either ‘triangles are triangular because they just are’ is not a case of circular reasoning, or it is a case of circular reasoning. If it is to be viewed as a case of circular reasoning, then I will proceed to show that circular reasoning is sometimes meaningfully right/justified/rational, and sometimes meaningfully wrong/irrational/absurd/contradictory. 

Consider the following cases of circular reasoning:

1) Jack is smiling because he is happy.

2) Triangles are justified as being understood as shapes because being a shape is a necessary semantical component of being a triangle.

Smiling is not a semantical component of happiness. In other words, it is not absurd for someone to be happy without smiling. If 1 implies smiling is a semantical component of happiness, then 1 is circular but absurd. Being a shape is a necessary semantical component of triangles. In other words, it is absurd for something to be triangular without being a shape. If 2 amounts to saying this, then 2 is circular but true. Now consider the following:

3) Basic beliefs are justified as being understood as always true because being always true is a necessary semantical component of being a basic belief.

4) That is a basic belief because it is always true.

As already highlighted, if there are no basic beliefs then there are no truths. So where 3 is not true, 1-4 are neither true, false, nor meaningful. Rejection of 4 logically implies nothing is truly meaningful or that semantics are fallible or amenable to change. This is the equivalent of saying that the semantic of ‘triangle’ can be changed to the semantic of ‘square’. Whilst we can change the word or label we ascribe to a given semantic, we cannot change the semantic itself. This is why we meaningfully have different languages. It is also why one language can be meaningfully translated to another.

How can we reject our own awareness of the semantic of triangle? And how can triangles be considered meaningful when it is not true or absurd that triangles have three sides? Triangles have always been meaningful and they have always meant the same thing (despite there being variations of them and an increase in understanding of them; you do not normally learn about the angles in a triangle until you do maths in school) because semantics are neither meaningfully dubitable nor meaningfully/semantically susceptible to change. You cannot meaningfully doubt the triangularity of triangle. You cannot meaningfully doubt the semantic of triangle as meaning what it means. To say that you can or have, is to say that you can or have seen a round square. Whilst you may have a 10th sense, you have certainly not seen a round square. Similarly, you have certainly not doubted the semantic of triangle as meaning what it means.

The previous two paragraphs show that if we accept 2 to be true (which we must do if we are semantically-aware of the semantic of triangle), then we must also accept 3 to be true as well. This means that we accept at least two instances of 4 to be true. The Pyrrhonian sceptic rejects 4 but denies any rejection has occurred on his part. What the Pyrrhonian sceptic wants is to refuse to commit to anything (this includes the commitment of refusing to commit to anything, which of course is impossible/absurd for a semantically-aware being to do). The position the Pyrrhonian sceptic takes of truly knowing nothing (or being aware of no semantic), can only hold true of insentient objects like rocks. I can say a truly insentient rock truly knows nothing because it is insentient. A self-aware semantically-aware subject cannot believe he knows nothing whilst being aware of semantics. Pyrrhonian scepticism is clearly absurd, therefore, it should not be treated as being meaningful, unknown, or gibberish. It should also not be treated as though it is nothing (which is what the most extreme nihilist would have us do), it should be treated as absurd. But what about our fallibility?

Our fallibility

Some will argue that our fallibility is such that we may understand something as being absurd, without that thing actually being absurd. Also, we may understand something as being true, without that thing actually being true. I will proceed to show that this is impossible/absurd.

The notion that an evil demon is capable of manipulating me into understanding ‘something coming from nothing’ is false because such a thing (something coming from nothing) is not understandable/meaningful. Me looking as though I’ve been deceived into believing something can come from nothing, is because I have not thought about “nothingness” sufficiently. Perhaps the evil demon has made me mistake a vacuum for “nothingness”. Therefore, whilst I say I believe “something can come from nothing”, what I’m actually understanding/believing/thinking is that something can come from a vacuum. But then how can one understand/believe a vacuum with zero potential as having the potential to produce something? One cannot. Therefore, if I really/meaningfully/truly understand or believe anything, it is that something can come from a vacuum with potential. Me labelling the semantic of ‘vacuum with potential’ as “nothing”, does not mean I actually semantically/meaningfully understand something coming from nothing. Alternatively, I’m not really/meaningfully understanding anything. I’m just uttering words without really knowing what I mean and saying that I believe in them (a robot can be programmed to do this too). 

As long as I understand what ‘somethingness’ and “nothingness” mean, no matter how hard the evil demon tries (or even God for that matter), he will never be able to get me to meaningfully believe something can come from “nothing”. How can I believe something can come from “nothing” whilst knowing what “nothing” is? If I know what “nothing” is, then I know something cannot come from it. I cannot be said to have an understanding of “nothing” if I believe something can come from it.

Even if I don’t understand what ‘somethingness’ and “nothingness” amount to, the evil demon will still never be able to get me to meaningfully believe something can come from “nothing”. How can I believe something can come from “nothing” without knowing what “nothing” is? I cannot.

Our fallibility is in our use of the wrong labels with regards to the semantics we are trying to highlight, or, in feigning understand of a word or theory we have not understood. The concept of “nothing” is a good example of this. How do we know we’re not falsely understanding ‘triangles’ or feigning understanding of them?

With regards to the concept of “nothing”, there is confusion because of how it is commonly used in a semantically consistent or non-absurd manner. When someone says “there’s nothing here”, they know they don’t mean ‘there’s non-Existence here’. They mean ‘nothing but space’ or ‘nothing relevant’. This is a matter of mismatching labels and semantics, or just not being wholly focused on what is being said. Sure, someone can “understand” triangles as being squares as a result of mismatching the label of “triangle” for the semantic of ‘square’, but then we do not call that understanding. We call that misunderstanding. How do we know we’re not misunderstanding what a triangle is? We don’t. We just have to see a posteriori if our labels match (I label the semantic ‘triangle’ “triangle” and you label the semantic ‘triangle’ “triangle”). But we definitely know that the semantic of ‘triangle’ is the semantic of ‘triangle’. We definitely know that the semantic of ‘triangle’ is not the semantic of ‘square’ (just as we know that a married man is not a bachelor). Even if someone calls it a “square” or a “dagjkagl”, no one can successfully understand a three sided shape as not being three sided. They either understand what a triangle is, or they don’t. For emphasis: We cannot mistake/misunderstand one semantic for another. For example, we cannot mistake/misunderstand the semantic of three-sided for the semantic of four-sided. We can only misunderstand/mistake which semantic is being focused on by another person (if any semantic is being focused on at all).

Of course, one can then ask how do we know we’ve understood what a triangle is? The simple answer is I don’t know if you’ve understood or are semantically-aware of triangle. If you haven’t, then you won’t be able to meaningfully talk about them (much like how a robot can be programmed to say something meaningful without being meaningfully aware of what it is saying). If I haven’t, then I won’t be able to be aware of them. If I’ve thought about them, then I’ve understood them to the level that I’ve successfully thought about them. If I’m aware of the semantic, then I’m aware of the semantic. This is meaningfully undeniable (as in one can absurdly or meaninglessly deny this, but they cannot meaningfully deny it). It cannot be that I was actually thinking about squares when I was actually thinking about triangles. And it cannot be that I was actually not thinking at all, when I was actually thinking about triangles. We can look at a more complex example, but the conclusion will be the same.

It is the norm for people to say triangles are three-sided and water is h2o. When people are asked “are all triangles three-sided?”, all who understand triangles (as well as the question), will say “yes” (unless they’re joking lying). If you ask someone “is water always h2o?”, they will either say “yes”, “no”, or “I don’t know”. If they say “I don’t know” and they are truthful, then they admit they haven’t thought about the matter enough or understood the question enough to be able to give a conclusive answer. This is not a matter of understanding something true as being false, or vice versa. It is simply an unknown to the person at hand. It is a lack of understanding or the absence of understanding. Despite this lack of understanding, some will inaccurately answer “yes” as opposed to accurately answering “I’m not sure” or “I’m not sure I understand the question”. Again, despite their inaccurate answer, this is not a case of understanding something false as being true. It is a lack of understanding of something.

If someone answers “no” and you ask them “when is water not h2o?” and they reply “water in dreams is not h2o”, then you know they understood what you meant by the question because they have given you the truth in relation to the question you asked of them with regards to the semantics you had in mind when you asked them the question. In other words, given the semantics involved, only one answer from them could have been semantically consistent, and they gave it to you. More specifically, you know their answer was true because describing water in dreams as not being water is absurd (semantically inconsistent). Your question semantically encompassed all forms of water and was labelled “water” as opposed to “the water that x is under the impression of scientists in what he calls his waking reality describe”.

Despite most (if not all) people acknowledging the existence of water in dreams, some such acknowledging people will answer “yes”. How can one have such an acknowledgement and answer “yes” to the question asked? Provided that one is not forgetful of this acknowledgement, one cannot truthfully answer “yes”. One can either fully understand the question, fully misunderstand the question, partially understand the question, partially misunderstand the question, partially understand and partially misunderstand the question, partially not understand the question, or fully not understand the question (as is the case with a robot or someone who just doesn’t listen to the question at all). Such acknowledging people cannot fully understand the question and then answer wrongly (unless they want to be absurd/contradictory or are forgetful/unfocused/unmindful of their acknowledgment. People are sometimes absurd in order to be funny, sometimes they are absurd for more sinister reasons. Sometimes they’re forgetful or not sufficiently focused). I will try to illustrate this further:

For someone to understand water as always being h2o, they’d have to understand h2o as being a necessary semantical component of water (just as three-sidedness is a necessary semantical component of triangle; hence why ‘triangles are always three-sided’ is a basic belief). Such an understanding of water is impossible (just as an understanding of 1 + 1 = sometimes 3 is impossible). Since such an understanding of water is impossible, then the person who answered “yes” to “is water always h2o?”, either understood the question (not the semantic) as meaning something else, or did not understand or focus on the question sufficiently but feigned understanding (if you told them the correct answer would win them a million dollars, they may not have answered incorrectly). It has to be one or the other, or a mixture of both.

One can wrongly label that which is semantically an a posteriori matter as “an a priori matter”, or that which they think is ‘almost certain’ as “100%”. But one cannot understand the a posteriori and the a priori (or almost certain and 100%) as being the same. One can wrongly label the semantic ‘water which the scientists in what the present moment me thinks my memories describe’ as “water” and correctly describe and understand this semantic as containing the semantical component of what we I call “h2o”, but this is not the same as one understanding the actual semantic of ‘water’ as always being h2o. Water in video games is not necessarily h2o, but triangles in video games (or anywhere else) are necessarily shapes. Again, it’s either a misunderstanding of labels, or a lack of focus on the semantical implications of what is being said, or just simply a lack of focus.

Every instance wherein which we pretended to understand something, we were aware that we were pretending. Every instance wherein which we understood ourselves as having understood something, we really did understand something. We can’t understand something yet pretend to understand it at the same time. It’s not pretend understanding if it’s actual understanding. Later finding out that our understanding was actually an understanding of another word or theory, or that our understanding was partial as opposed to complete, does not mean that we misunderstood one semantic for another semantic. You cannot mistake the semantic of ‘night’ for the semantic of ‘Knight’. A new English language learner can understandably misunderstand us as meaning ‘night’ when we say “it’s Knight time” when it’s time to watch the tv series “Knight” that happens to be on at night (and the learner is unaware of the TV series). Semantics are not at fault here.

Where someone attempts to make clear to us the impossibilities or contradictions in a contradictory movie or philosophical argument, we either recognise/understand the contradictions, or we don’t. If we don’t recognise the contradictions, no understanding has taken place. So it’s not a case of understanding something false as being true. If we do recognise the contradictions, then understanding has taken place and we recognise something false/absurd as being false/absurd. Alternatively, we just hold a different understanding to what the movie or philosophical argument intended by smuggling in premises or semantics that are irrelevant to what the movie or philosophical argument intended. For example, a contradictory philosophical argument suggests that married bachelors can exist. If one smuggles in the semantic of ‘a bachelor who pretends to be married’ and attaches the label of “married bachelor” to it, and then expresses agreement with the contradictory philosophical argument, then one has not agreed with the philosophical argument because one has not understood the philosophical argument to be able to agree with it. Alternatively, where no understanding has occurred at all, how can one meaningfully agree with that which they don’t understand? How can one agree with that which is meaningless to them? They can pretend to agree, but they can’t truly agree.

Hopefully, what all this shows is that it is impossible/absurd for someone to genuinely understand something as a basic belief, without that thing actually being a basic belief. Sure, we add to our understanding of things, but the things that we genuinely understood before we furthered our understanding, never were contradictory or absurd. How could they be? We’ve always understood triangles as being three-sided shapes. At some point we understood additional truths about them. There can be no additional truth for us to learn that renders triangles as being anything other than three-sided shapes. We know this. Why absurdly treat it as an unknown?

Meaningfully distinguishing between truth and falsehood

Near the beginning of this post I stressed that absurdities should be treated as absurdities, and unknowns should be treated as unknowns. The semantic of unknown (that which we don’t know) is clearly distinct from the semantic of absurd (that which we know to be semantically inconsistent, or contradict a truth). Either this understanding is in place or it isn’t. If it is in place and one does recognise Pyrrhonian scepticism to be absurd, then one should not act as though they may know nothing. One should treat the absurd as absurd. One should not lie or be insincere to one’s awareness (which encompasses the semantics that one is aware of). It is absurd/wrong/contradictory of one to do so.

There is Existence (it is semantically inconsistent to deny this). It is hypothetically possible to have more than one galaxy, planet, or universe, but it is impossible to have more than one “Existence”. By “Existence” I mean that which all things exist because of or as a result of. Without Existence, nothing would encompass, sustain, and unify all things into one Existence. This would mean that it is possible for one set of existents to be in existent A, and another set of existents to be in existent B, such that no existent encompasses A and B. Since no existent encompasses A and B, this means that non-Existence separates A from B. For non-Existence to separate A from B, it would have to exist. It is contradictory to say non-Existence separates A from B because non-Existence does not exist for it to do this. Hence the necessary existence of Existence. Semantics exist in Existence, as do imaginary unicorns (I imagined a unicorn just now). How real something is in its existing, is another matter. In any case, if x exists, then it is either in Existence (or sustained by Existence), or it is Existence.

Lies exist, but they are not true of Existence. For example, if I say to you “triangles have four sides” whilst being aware and focused on the semantics of ‘triangle’ and ‘four-sided’, then I have lied to you because I have knowingly described something that contradicts truth as truth. It is not true of the semantic of triangle (which is a part of Existence) that ‘having four sides’ is a semantical component of it. Similarly, it is not true of the semantic of me (which is a part of Existence) that it believes triangles to be four-sided. Thus, it is not true of Existence that triangles have four sides, and it is not true of Existence that I believe triangles have four sides. what is true of Existence is that I am a liar. Whilst people can be contradictory, Existence cannot. In other words, whist it is not contradictory/impossible for people to be contradictory, it is contradictory/impossible for Existence or Reality (capital R to emphasis the true reality that all lesser realities are contingent on or sustained by) to be contradictory.

Triangles have three sides because Existence/Reality is the way it is. In other words, Reality/Existence is such that triangles are always three sided. Existence/Reality is also such that planets aren’t always green. It is Reality that makes semantics true (a priori) and the labels we use for them possible (a posteriori). We are, after all, fully contingent on Existence/Reality (as opposed to non-Existence or non-Reality). We are not Existence for us to be able to meaningfully say “it is us who make triangles three-sided as opposed to Existence” or “Existence does not sustain us, we sustain Existence”. We did not get our semantics from non-Existence. When we say round squares are absurd, we are in effect saying Existence/Reality is such that round squares are not true of It (you will never see, imagine, or dream of a round square). Every truthful statement we make implicitly contains the premise ‘Existence is such that… ‘. On the other hand, every false statement we make inaccurately describes something about Existence. Consider the following definitions/semantics for the words “true” and “false”:

True = that which is in relation to Existence as described or stated. For example “our earth is round”.

False = that which is in relation to Existence not as described or stated. For example “our earth is flat”.

If Existence/Reality is such that our earth is round, then the statement “our earth is round” accurately/truthfully describes something in relation to Existence (in this case our earth). This match between how Existence is (specifically that it includes our earth which is round) and the statement, gives the statement the quality of being true or semantically consistent in relation to Existence. If Existence is such that our earth is flat, then the statement “our earth is round” inaccurately/falsely describes something about Existence. This mismatch between how Existence is and the statement, gives the statement the quality of being false or semantically inconsistent in relation to Existence.

True = that which semantically/meaningfully matches how Existence is.

False = that which semantically/meaningfully contradicts Existence.

An Attempt at a True Theory of Everything (Part 1: Existence)

Last updated 6/9/2021

This post consists of the following parts: “Existence, reality, and the imagination”, “Hypothetically possible versus hypothetically impossible”, “Determined versus random”, and “Time travel”.

Relevant from what was established in “Wrongly embracing absurdities in the name of unknowns, and the indubitable nature of semantics and reason” are the following truths:

It is hypothetically possible to have more than one galaxy, planet, or universe, but it is impossible to have more than one “Existence”. By “Existence” I mean that which all things exist because of or as a result of. Without Existence, nothing would encompass or unify all things into one Existence. This would mean that it is possible for one set of existents to be in existent A, and another set of existents to be in existent B, such that no existent encompasses A and B. Since no existent encompasses A and B, this means that non-Existence separates A from B. For non-Existence to separate A from B, it would have to exist. It is contradictory/absurd (semantically inconsistent) to say non-Existence separates A from B because non-Existence does not exist for it to do this. Hence the necessary existence of Existence. Semantics exist in Existence, as do imaginary unicorns (I imagined one just now). How real something is in Existence, is another matter. In any case, if x exists, then it either belongs to Existence, or it is Existence.

It is also possibly good to be mindful of the following truths before proceeding:

Anything that is semantically/meaningfully inconsistent or contradictory (such as a word, statement, or belief), is definitely not true of Existence.

The existence of unicorns on our planet can be meaningfully doubted by beings who do not have absolute knowledge of what’s on our planet whilst being aware of our planet, but the existence of Existence can never be meaningfully doubted by any being. There are things/existents beyond our being/existing, but there are no things beyond Existence. Existence is never absent or not-Existing.

There is Existence, therefore, there is no non-Existence. Married-bachelors, round-triangles, existing-non-existing things, and non-Existence are all absurd/contradictory (semantically inconsistent).

Existence, reality, and the imagination

It is impossible to be thinking about nothing. One is either thinking about something, or one is not thinking at all (like a rock that is insentient). We cannot view thoughts as not being in Existence because that would imply they are “in non-Existence” (which is absurd). Also, thoughts cannot pop in and out of Existence because nothing can enter or exit Existence. There is no “bridge” or “door” or “connection” or “existent” separating Existence on one side from non-Existence on the other. If Existence was spatially or temporally finite, then that would mean it has an end. If Existence has an end, then non-Existence has a beginning (either spatially or temporally). Nothing can have a beginning in non-Existence (because non-Existence does not exist for something to have a beginning in it). Hence the absurdity of non-Existence. A finite dream or tree begins and ends in Existence (as do all other things with beginnings and ends). Existence does not begin or end in Existence because Existence is Existence (it encompasses all beginnings and ends) and non-Existence is absurd. Since non-Existence existing is contradictory, Existence is spatially and temporally infinite. Thus, anyone who holds the belief that Existence is finite, holds a contradictory/irrational belief.

Since there is no “bridge” to non-Existence in Existence for something to exit to; or put differently, since there is no non-Existence for something to enter Existence from, we are forced to conclude that all potential items of thought (including semantics) are in Existence. To reject this is to say items of thought do not exist in Existence, or that they are nothing, or that they are in non-Existence, or that they come from non-Existence. It is absurd to describe an existing thing such as an item of thought as existing in non-Existence (or independently of Existence).

We know that dreams and items of thought exist. The question is, how are they existing? We describe our waking experiences as being our most real, our dreams as being less real than our waking experiences (although some have claimed to have had dreams more real than that of their waking experiences), and our imaginative thoughts as being less real than our dreams. You’ve perhaps heard of someone comforting someone else who woke up from a nightmare saying “it wasn’t real, it was only a dream”. Nightmares or dreams cannot be said to have no reality whatsoever (by this I mean they cannot be said to be wholly independent of Reality like contradictions are). If you experience x, then x is a real experience for you (even though realer experiences may be hypothetically possible). How truly/potently/completely real the experience is, is another matter.

Can we describe virtual reality as a kind of reality? Surely if some virtual world (like the one that is depicted in the movie “The matrix”) felt as real as our real world, we’d have to describe it as feeling equally real. And if the virtual world felt more real than our real world, we’d have to describe it as feeling more real than our real world. In that scenario, we’d have to describe the mechanism that takes us from our less real “real” world to the more real “virtual” world, as a bridge between that which is less real to that which is more real. Thus, our standards would have to shift such that we label the “virtual” world as our real world, and our “real” world as our less real world. A priori speaking, how real something is, is the only relevant factor to describing how real something is. Whether a posteriori mechanisms such as being a brain in a vat, or being plugged in to the matrix is the truth or not, is another matter. So long as the a posteriori is correctly interpreted in line with the a priori such that it does not contradict the a priori, we have no contradictory, absurd, or semantically inconsistent beliefs/theories/interpretations/sayings.

As far as we know a posteriori, all virtual reality worlds games (such as those playable on Playstation vr) are designed by some game designer or developer who uses software to build them. The worlds are made accessible once the relevant device has been turned on, and they are accessed once the software is run and the headset is put on. Thus, with regards to virtual reality worlds games that we have access to, we have an a posteriori understanding of how they are made and how they are instantiated. When it comes to dreams, we are not as well informed. We need to go to sleep. That’s all we solidly know a posteriori. What are the tools used to build the dream worlds (if any)? Who designs the dream worlds (if anyone)? We recognise that there are an endless number of hypothetical possibilities or items of thought (just as there are an endless number of numbers or possible dreams). Do we create these items of thought from nothing? Obviously no because that would mean something has come from non-Existence.

Consider my current situation and what I’m doing now very specifically. I am doing activity a (sitting), in location xyz, at time t, in world p. With this being the case, can you meaningfully assert or imagine me doing a different activity b (standing), in the exact same location xyz, at the exact same time t, and in the exact same world p? No because that would amount to you imagining me as sitting and standing at the same time. You cannot imagine this. At best, you can imagine me doing activity b (standing), in a different but identical location xyz², at time t²in a different but identical world p², but certainly not in world p.

The previous paragraph shows that for some reason, we are not able to imagine anyone as sitting and standing at the same time. What is it that renders one thought as being irrational or hypothetically impossible, and another as being meaningful or hypothetically possible? With regards to our irrational thoughts, it is simply the case that they are hypothetically impossible because they can never exist, therefore, they are absolutely not true of Existence. For example, a round square can never exist, therefore, round squares are hypothetically impossible. If it was possible for them to exist in any way, shape, or form, then they would not be classed as a hypothetical impossibility. This explains why we can never make sense of them. How can we make sense of something that is not true of Existence whilst we are wholly dependent on Existence? We cannot.

Hypothetically possible versus hypothetically impossible

With regards to wholly meaningful items of thought such as hypothetical possibilities, non-absurd theories, stories, and so on, we can say with certainty that the mind isn’t accessing non-Existence (again, this is because non-Existence does not exist for it to be accessed). We can also say that it’s not creating something from nothing (or non-Existence). This means that it’s either creating something from something, or it’s just accessing something that’s already there. For the sake of highlighting a particular point, for the next three paragraphs forget the earlier conclusion of Existence is necessarily infinite.

Hume suggests that all our items of thought are constructed from simple concepts that we have attained through experience. For example, we experience shapes by seeing them, and we acquire them through this experience. Infinity is not an absurd concept. It has clear semantical value. Although we have not experienced anything infinite, we are aware of this semantic. So Hume’s empirical approach won’t work here. Where does infinity come from? What makes it possible for us to have awareness of such a semantic? As with everything, Existence (as opposed to non-Existence) makes it possible for us to have awareness of infinity. But how does It do this? What is the link between Existence and infinity? In other words, how do we explain infinity in terms of Existence?

Some, such as Hume himself, have argued that infinity is the negation of finite. We acquire awareness of finite by seeing finite things, and acquire awareness of infinity by negating finite. Thus, infinity is linked to Existence via finite. But how would this negation work? Semantically/meaningfully/rationally speaking, If you were to negate/erase the boundaries of anything, you would either be left with a smaller version of that thing, or the non-existence of that thing. If Existence was finite and you were to negate it, you would be left with non-Existence, not something infinite. On the other hand, if you were to negate all finite things within an infinite Existence, then all you would be left with is something infinite (Existence). But this is still not the same as “negating X results in an infinite X” (which is what Hume appeared to have had in mind). Y is infinite, X is finite. Negating the boundaries of X results in the non-existence of X and the continued Existence of Y. Or alternatively, it results in an even smaller version of X, and the continued Existence of Y. What it does not result in is the non-Existence of Y and the existence of an infinite X. Hume’s belief that we obtained infinity from finite, is clearly absurd/false/contradictory in relation to Existence or not true of Existence.

If we are to say that our minds (or us beings) have constructed the concept of infinity, with what have they constructed it with? We know that we cannot count or add to infinity (we can try, but we will never reach infinity). Is this truth something that our minds have constructed on their own, or is it simply a feature/truth/aspect of Existence that we are aware of (just as 1 + 1 = 2 is a truth of Existence)?

Clearly, when it comes to infinity, it’s not that the mind creates something from something (we do not create the semantic of infinity from the semantic of finite), it’s more a case of it focusing on or being aware of something. Does this mean that that which is infinite actually exists in Existence? That which is truly infinite cannot exist in Existence because It truly has no beginning and no end. The only thing that can truly have no beginning and no end, is Existence Itself (not something in It).

If we don’t view Existence as being truly infinite, then we cannot explain infinity in terms of Existence. This would mean that nothing infinite has ever existed or will ever exist. This would mean that infinity is hypothetically impossible. How can we who are wholly contingent on Existence make any sense of infinity if Existence was finite? How can a finite Existence conceive of an infinite Existence independently of an infinite Existence?

Unicorns exist at least as meaningful imaginary animals, whereas round-squares don’t exist as imaginary shapes because round-squares are not rational/meaningful shapes for one to be able to access via the imagination/mind or otherwise. Put differently, Existence is such that there’s no such thing as a round-square, therefore, round-squares are hypothetically impossible (absolutely/objectively/necessarily not true of Existence). There being unicorns on our planet is subjectively not true of Existence (as in we as subjects have this interpretation of our planet, but because we lack omniscience with regards to what’s on our planet, or because we have not empirically verified what’s on our planet in an absolute sense, we do not know if it is absolutely/necessarily true or false that there are unicorns on our planet). The claim “there are no unicorns on our planet” is an educated guess/assumption/conjecture by us. It is not knowledge that we have. It is knowledge that any being that has omniscience with regards to our planet has. We know triangles have three sides (as in we have knowledge of this). We don’t know if there are unicorns on our planet. We assume there aren’t (but it is probably not an unreasonable assumption for us given what we have been exposed to and our limitations to further empirically verify. In contrast to this it is probably unreasonable for us to assume that the earth is flat or that our neighbours are androids. It is certainly unreasonable for me to assume that the earth is flat or that my neighbours are androids. You may have been exposed to something that I have not that would make it reasonable for you to assume that your neighbours are androids or that the earth is flat). Clearly, there is a clear distinction between what we know and what we assume.

If infinity is a hypothetical impossibility, then it should be an irrational concept like “round-square”. It might be objected here that whilst all irrationalities are hypothetical impossibilities, not all hypothetical impossibilities are irrationalities/contradictions. Just as ‘shape with interior angles totalling 180 degrees’ and ‘triangle’ denote the same thing, ‘hypothetically impossible’ and ‘irrational’ also denote the same thing. What is the difference between them? Is it not the case that when we find a proposition to be hypothetically impossible we label it as being irrational/absurd/false or not true of Existence? And is it not the case that when we find a proposition to be absurd/false, we find it to be hypothetically impossible? My friend says that I’m at the park right now despite me being at home. It’s absurd/false/irrational/impossible for me to be at the park and at home at the same time. It is not true of Existence that I’m at the park when I’m at home (unless I have one foot in the park and one foot in my home. Still, the whole of me cannot be at home whilst the whole of me is at the park).

Suppose we were to say that infinity was hypothetically impossible but not irrational. How then would we be able to account for our awareness of it? We would be saying that infinity has nothing to do with Existence, yet we as beings who are fully dependent on Existence, have somehow managed to gain awareness of it from non-Existence. This is absurd. We know we could not have constructed the concept from other concepts, or reached it via the negation of some other concept. So what has allowed for our awareness of infinity if not Existence being truly infinite Itself?

As highlighted near the beginning of this post, Existence is necessarily truly infinite, therefore, infinity is not an absurd concept. As already highlighted but in different words, we cannot confine the truly infinite to just being in Existence (just as we cannot confine Existence to just being in Existence). Since nothing can become truly infinite (you can expand to infinity but you will never become truly infinite. You can count to infinity but you will never reach infinity), we are semantically/rationally obliged to say that infinity is not a hypothetical possibility. So the truth is not that Existence has the potential to be truly infinite, or that it is possibly truly infinite, or that that which is truly infinite is confined to our minds. Rather, the truth is that Existence is certainly infinite. We must view Existence as being truly infinite as that is the only way Existence can accommodate the semantic of infinity. That is the only way we can explain infinity in terms of Existence. That is the only way we can avoid the absurdity of something (our awareness of infinity) coming from nothing or non-Existence.

Infinity solves a lot of problems for us. If we were to view Existence as truly infinite, then all hypothetical possibilities truly become hypothetically possible. This is because there is infinite potential (some would call this Omnipotence) available for any given state of affairs, worlds, or beings to occur. In other words, in a truly infinite Existence, all hypothetical possibilities exist such that they can all come to attain reality or truth (this does not mean that they necessarily will. Can and will do not mean the same thing). Which is the same as saying all hypothetical possibilities truly are hypothetically possible. Now consider the alternative: Not all hypothetical possibilities can come to attain reality or truth. Which is the same as saying not all hypothetical possibilities are truly hypothetically possible. If x can’t ever be brought about or come to attain reality/truth (like a roundsquare), then how can x be considered as hypothetically possible? Shouldn’t it be considered as hypothetically impossible? If something is hypothetically possible, then it truly is a hypothetical possibility. We cannot say if something is hypothetically possible, then it may be a hypothetical possibility. It either is or it isn’t. This is different to saying that something like a 10th sense is a possibility. When we say 10th sense, we don’t have enough information to classify as hypothetically impossible or hypothetically possible. A 10th sense is an unknown to us. It is not a known hypothetical possibility to us. We should not be saying a 10th sense is hypothetically possible. We should be saying a 10th sense is an unknown to us. Similarly, we don’t have enough information to know if our Joe Biden (the one in our world) is doing anything right now. This is just another example of an unknown, but unlike a 10th sense, it is not as absolutely unknown to us. We can have some reasonable assumptions about Joe Biden (one such reasonable assumption is that he was born in America. The assumption is reasonable for us (or at least me) given our (or at least my) empirical observations) but we cannot have any reasonable assumptions about a 10th sense.

Assume we don’t know if time travel is hypothetically possible or not. Now compare the following two sentences:

A) It’s possible that time travel is hypothetically possible.

B) It’s unknown whether time travel is hypothetically possible or not.

There are things that we know to be hypothetically possible (such as me raising my arm in the next second), things that we know to be true (such as triangles having three sides), things that we know to be hypothetically impossible (such as a triangle having four sides), and things that we know we don’t know to be true, hypothetically possible, or hypothetically impossible (such as a 10th sense, or who will win the next World Cup, or whether I will raise my arm in the next second or not, or whether there will even be a next World Cup). Regarding the first three categories, we know the truth in relation to Existence. As in we know that Existence is such that my arm can (but not necessarily will) be raised in the next second, or that It is such that triangles have three sides, or that It is such that it does not include four-sided triangles. Regarding the fourth category, we don’t have the truth or knowledge in relation to Existence, and we know this. As in we know Existence is such that we are such that there are things about Existence that we don’t know.

There is no difference between something that’s possible and something that’s hypothetically possible. My usage of the phrase “hypothetically possible” instead of the word “possible” in A, was intended to highlight the difference between the two different semantical usages of the word “possible”. In one usage, “possible” is used to highlight our ignorance of something in relation to Existence. In another usage, “possible” is used to highlight our awareness/knowledge of something in relation to Existence. In the statement “it’s possible that time travel is possible“, the first “possible” highlights our ignorance about something in relation to Existence (does it include within it the potential for time travel? In other words, is time travel possible/knowable/meaningful/rational?), whilst the second ‘possible‘ highlights true potentiality or possibility. A possibility (something that we know can attain reality in Existence) can be contrasted with an unknown (something that we don’t know can attain reality (like a 10th sense), or, something that we don’t know will attain reality (like “our” hands being raised in the the next minute), or, something that we don’t know to be real/true or not real/true in relation to us (did “I” take out the trash?) or Existence (does Existence have more dimensions than “I” currently know?) or anything in It (are there unicorns in “our” galaxy?).

So, we don’t know if a 10th sense is absurd like a round square because we don’t have enough information about Existence to conclude absurd/irrational or meaningful/rational. Do we have enough information about unicorns to conclude rational or irrational/impossible? If we say unicorns are hypothetically impossible, then consistency in semantics would have us say unicorn is an absurd/irrational concept. Unicorn is clearly a meaningful/understandable concept, therefore, it is not a hypothetical impossibility. Furthermore, if we say unicorns are as meaningless to us as a 10th sense, or as ambiguous to us as time travel, we would be falsely describing ourselves as not clearly understanding what a unicorn is. Again, ‘unicorn’ is clearly meaningful to us, therefore, unicorns are at least hypothetically possible. By this I mean Existence has the potential to produce/create/sustain unicorns. Some may have already had dreams with unicorns in them. Some may have had some experience with unicorns or aliens. How real their experience was, is another matter.

If Existence is truly infinite (which it is), then it is not finite in terms of potential. It is absurd to say “Existence does not have the potential to produce another world similar to ours in terms of realness that contains unicorns”. To say such a thing is to say “unicorns as real as our horses are hypothetically impossible”. Such a statement logically implies that Existence is not truly infinite (due to limitations in potential), and Existence not being truly infinite is an irrational/contradictory statement. Round-squares are hypothetically impossible, but unicorns-as-real-as-our-horses is not an impossibility/absurdity. Nor is it an unknown (we know Existence can produce unicorns-as-real-as-our-horses precisely because It is truly infinite. Whether It will, is another matter).

Again, for emphasis, if unicorn is a hypothetical impossibility, then it should be an irrational/absurd concept. It should be meaningless or non-sensical. Clearly, it is a meaningful concept (not unlike how a musical note played by an instrument is an actual pitch or sound). Similarly, unicorns-as-real-as-our-horses is also a meaningful concept. It doesn’t matter that we reached the concept or semantic of ‘unicorn’ or ‘unicorn-as-real-as-our-horses’ by combining other concepts or semantics. I constructed the concept of ‘asfhjk’ (which denotes a tyrannical round square with horns and wings) from multiple concepts too, but somehow, unicorn instantiates clear meaning, whilst asfhjk instantiates clear absurdity. We know that no being can make sense of ‘asfhjk’, but we can make clear sense of ‘unicorn’. We must rationally account for why this happens. In other words, we must explain why this happens in terms of Existence, and in relation to Existence. Our task is simple: Since it is clearly absurd for Existence to be finite, it is clear that all meaningful things are meaningful as a result of Existence being what It is (truly infinite). A finite Existence cannot accommodate an infinite number of semantics (or possibilities), and something cannot come from non-Existence. 

Not all hypothetical possibilities have to attain reality in order for us to consider them as true hypothetical possibilities. Will attain reality, and can attain reality are two different truths/semantics. The former does not have to be true of all hypothetical possibilities for us to be able to say all hypothetical possibilities truly are hypothetically possible, but the latter does. We are rationally/semantically obliged to abstain from believing unicorns will attain physical reality somewhere in our universe, or have attained physical reality in our universe, because the matter is solidly unknown to us (and that is because we are not omniscient with regards to what’s in our universe, or what will be in our universe in the future). But we are rationally/semantically obliged to believe Existence can produce physical unicorns (physical by our standards) because we know ‘unicorn’ (or even ‘physical unicorn’) is a meaningful concept.

Joe Biden flying is not an impossibility. We are rationally obliged to acknowledge that a Joe Biden can fly because we know the proposition is meaningful. Do we have the same rational authority to say “our Joe Biden, the one in our world, can fly”? Could there be premises in place (such as gravity) that render such a thing as absurd? The answer to this question will hopefully become clearer and clearer in the posts that follow.

We know that whatever the mind does, it does so within Existence and with what Existence provides or sustains. It does so because of the nature of Existence (truly infinite). Given the necessity of a truly infinite Existence, and the semantical implications of a truly infinite Existence, it is clear that our minds never create something from something. They simply access, or focus on, or experience one of an endless number of hypothetical possibilities (which they sometimes reach by combining or adding different concepts and traits). This means that these hypothetical possibilities or items of thought are all in Existence (which is no different than saying hypothetical possibilities exist in Existence as opposed to exist in non-Existence, or not exist at all). As highlighted near the beginning of this post, items of thought cannot pop in and out of Existence. The same is true of hypothetical possibilities.

From an allegorical perspective, if you imagine an image that has not been coloured in as being a real/true hypothetical possibility, and imagine an image that has been coloured in in some way or to some degree as being a real hypothetical possibility that has attained reality/truth in relation to us (because we experienced it in some way or to some degree), then the point I’m trying to make might become clearer. That is, that all hypothetical possibilities exist in Existence irrespective of whether we’re imagining them, dreaming them, or experiencing them in a more potent manner. How else can we account for the semantical value of clearly meaningful things in terms of Existence? If one carefully reflects on this matter, they will see that rejecting this logically implies the acceptance of something coming from nothing. Also, the Copenhagen interpretation of the double slit experiment (which I will not go into detail) might serve as food for thought here.

Is nothingness or non-Existence meaningful? If Existence gives meaning to everything by everything existing in Existence, then that means that nothingness or non-Existence must also exist. This is false. Non-Existence is the negation or absence of Existence (which is absurd/contradictory/irrational). When someone says “there’s nothing in the box” they do not mean ‘there’s non-Existence in the box’. They mean ‘there’s only air inside the box’ or ‘there’s nothing relevant in the box’. When one tries to think of nothing, they probably think of a vacuum (which is not nothing). Non-Existence is the very definition of false/absurd or not true of Existence. Married bachelors are non-Existent or not true of Existence. Non-Existence is non-Existent or not true of Existence. If I meaningfully say I know what “nothing” or “married bachelors” are, then I’m saying I know they are absurdities. I’m saying I know that they are things that are not true of Existence. What I am not saying is that they are things that are true of Existence that I or some god have made sense of. It would be absurd/contradictory of me to say this.

One can think by focusing on sounds or letters that appear to have no purpose or meaning (for example, I’m thinking about “fsjkgfnsjkgsnjkg”). One can think by focusing on what is false or absurd (for example, I try thinking about “round squares”, “sitting and standing at the same time”, or “non-Existence”. If I’m doing any actual meaningful thinking in these cases, then I am simply thinking about how these propositions, or concepts, or phrases, are absurd). One can also think by focusing on what is rational/meaningful (for example, I’m thinking about ‘unicorns’, ‘whether to sit or stand’, ‘Existence’, ‘infinity’, and so on).

Let’s recap what has been said so far. All meaningful things (which include all hypothetical possibilities) and absurd things (which include absurd concepts, absurd beliefs, absurd people, and so on) exist in Existence. The former are true of Existence (as in what they describe actually exists in Existence (potential or otherwise). This is why they are meaningful) the latter are also true of Existence but what they describe isn’t true of Existence. This is why what they describe is meaningless, non-sensical, absurd, false, or impossible. An important relation between rational/irrational, truth/falsehood, Existence/non-Existence has hopefully been made clear (or clearer).

The truth about Existence is such that in the next second, I can physically raise my hand. In other words, it is hypothetically possible for me to raise my hand in the next second. If I do this, then the truth will be such that the hypothetical possibility of ‘p (a hypothetically possible me) doing action q in location xyz at time t’, attained physical reality in relation to me (the me that we think is the real me). Which would mean the proposition of p did action q in location xyz at time t attained truth/reality in relation to me is true of Existence. If I do not do this, then that hypothetical possibility will not have attained physical reality/truth in relation to me, and that proposition is not true of Existence. If physically travelling back in time is hypothetically impossible, and I did not physically raise my hand at that point in time, has the hypothetical possibility of me raising my hand at that point in time become hypothetically impossible?

Suppose myreality is such I am such that in addition to being able to stay or go back to any location xyz in “my” physical world, I can also physically (not just mentally) go back to any time t. Further suppose I raise my hand in the next second such that p has committed action q at location xyz at time t’ attained reality/truth in relation to me. I then desire for this hypothetical possibility (p committing action q at location xyz at time t) to attain reality again in relation to me. So I physically go back in time in an attempt to raise my hand again when that time physically comes. Wouldn’t that mean that I would find my past self sitting there? If I ask him to move in order to take his place and raise my hand, it is no longer the same hypothetical possibility attaining reality. Even if the past me moved over and I raised my hand in the exact same place, time, and manner to how the past me raised his hand, there is still a difference in what has attained reality/truth in relation to me. There is a difference between the present me and the past me such that the p that’s tied to me (or rooted in me) is not absolutely the same as the p that’s tied to the past me. The p in relation to the past me does not semantically encompass ‘he is physically travelling back in time‘, where as the p in relation to the present me does. This clear difference in who’s hand is being raised, means that both the propositions and the hypothetical possibilities are not the same. If I went back in time purely as an invisible observer, has the hypothetical possibility of p committing action q at location xyz at time t attained reality in relation to me (or even me) a second time? No.

If I go back in time to before the hypothetical possibility occurs or attains reality in relation to me, then at that past point in time that I’m in, the truth is such that the hypothetical possibility has not yet attained reality in relation to me. But has it attained truth/reality in relation to me? Since the hypothetical possibilities are not the same (because in one version it includes me being there, in another it doesn’t), the answer is no. Furthermore, for me to go back in time to raise my hand a second time at that point in time, or to just not raise my hand at that point in time, would amount to me raising my hand twice at the same time, or me not raising my hand and raising my hand at the same time (both of which are contradictory. You cannot raise your hand and not raise your hand at the same time. Also, you cannot raise your hand twice at the same time. You raise it the first time, then you raise it the second time at a different time to the first time). Time travel (the one where you go back in time to change the future you really truly came from) is clearly contradictory.

Determined versus random

Suppose we have a random number generator that can only be used once. It is definitely going to be used and it can generate any number from 1 to 100. Whilst any of these 100 hypothetical possibilities can come to attain reality in relation to the number generator, only one of these 100 hypothetical possibilities will come to attain reality. My friend and I are in the same world as the number generator. My friend has some knowledge of the future of this world such that he knows exactly what number the random number generator is going to generate. He says “there aren’t 100 hypothetical possibilities that can come to attain reality in relation to the random number generator. There is only one.” As far as he’s concerned, the other 99 hypothetical possibilities are actually impossibilities because they will not attain reality in relation to the number generator. Who is right? Me who believes in 100 hypothetical possibilities, or my friend who believes in one?

Compare and contrast two different number generators that can only be used once. Both generate the number 19. One was set to generate the number 19 in a determined manner, whilst the other was set to generate any number from 1 to 100 in a random manner. This literally means that whilst it (the random number generator) could have generated only one number (call this layer 1), that number could have been any number from 1 to 100 (call this layer 2). This is the same as saying any number from 1 to 100 was hypothetically possible for the random number generator to generate. Denying this would be an utter disregard for the semantics and the mechanisms involved in the numbers being generated. Knowledge of the future does not alter the mechanisms involved in the numbers being generated. One future outcome does not render all past possible outcomes as not being possible at that past point in time.

Consider the alternative: It’s only hypothetically possible for the random number generator to generate the number 19 (which is clearly descriptive of a random determined number generator. There’s no such thing as a random-determined, and there’s no such thing as a married-bachelor). But it’s not just a hypothetical possibility as far as my friend is concerned, it’s a reality/truth in relation to our world who’s time has not yet been reached. A hypothetical possibility that has not yet attained reality/truth in relation to our world yet (but certainly will). So my friend hasn’t just discovered what is hypothetically possible and what is not hypothetically possible. We “discovered” this together when we read the instruction manual for the random number generator which clearly stated “this random number generator can only generate one number from 1 to 100, and we guarantee that it really is random”. My friend has discovered which of these hypothetical possibilities will come to attain reality/truth. This discovery does not render the non-reality attaining hypothetical possibilities as being hypothetically impossible at that past point in time. Back then they were hypothetically possible, now they are hypothetically impossible. Further compare and contrast the following two sentences with regards to two number generators that can only be used once:

Sentence A: 100 hypothetical possibilities can come to attain reality and 1 (the number 19 being generated) will come to attain reality.

Sentence B: 1 hypothetical possibility (the number 19 being generated) can come to attain reality, and it will come to attain reality.

Both sentences A and B accurately describe the truth with regards to the state of two number generators before and after generating their number in world w. If we focus on the future aspect of their respective timelines, the truth is such that they both generate the number 19. The truth is also such that at this future point in time, all 100 hypothetical possibilities from sentence A, and the 1 hypothetical possibility from sentence B, are no longer hypothetically possible. They are, at this future point in time, hypothetically impossible because the past cannot occur in the future, and their time has passed. This does not mean that they have ceased to exist in Existence. The past does not go out of Existence, therefore, those past hypothetical possibilities also do not go out of Existence. This is why we are meaningfully able to say it was hypothetically possible. If those past hypothetical possibilities weren’t/aren’t/won’t be in Existence, no being would ever be able to talk about them at all as it would be a case of something coming from nothing. This is why we can imagine a different past to the one that actually/really/truly occurred for us (or in relation to us). Different pasts truly were hypothetically possible for us. We can also imagine futures that haven’t occurred for us. But unlike the past, we have no solid a posteriori idea of what the truth will be in relation to us (despite there objectively being such a truth in relation to us). I have no solid a posteriori idea if I will die tomorrow or go to the park, but I have a solid a posteriori idea of what I ate ten minutes ago.

It might be objected that since it was determined beforehand that the random number generator was going to generate the number 19, the number 19 wasn’t randomly generated. Where things are pre-determined, randomness is absurd. Is there a difference between something being known in advance, and something being pre-determined?

Consider free-will or our supposed ability to choose. For God who knows all that is knowable, it is determined/known that I’m going to choose y in circumstance x. This is a hypothetical possibility to me who’s truth is unknown to me, and a hypothetical possibility to God who’s truth is known to God. It’s a hypothetical possibility who’s truth is unknown to me in that I don’t know what I would choose in circumstance x despite knowing what I can choose in circumstance x. It’s a hypothetical possibility to God who’s truth is known to God in that God knows I can, and will choose y in circumstance x.

If God brings about circumstance x, I choose y (which of course means that I was determined to choose y and this was not a random choice. This is not unlike me being determined to choose to do things that I think are good, if I’m determined to choose to be good that is). I literally choose. Can one non-absurdly say that I did not choose? The hypothetical possibility semantically/meaningfully contains the word choose. This is the first indication of it being true that I chose (but of course I will defend/illustrate this further). If God does not bring about circumstance x, then the aforementioned hypothetical possibility does not change. As in it remains true of Existence that at that point in time, if I was exposed to circumstance x, I would have chosen y. But it may be that at a different future or past point in time, if I am/was exposed to x, I would not choose y. I will hopefully discuss free-will in my future posts. For now, let’s go back to number generators. The number generators that will be discussed in the proceeding paragraphs can be used endlessly.

God knows that it is determined that random number generator r, will generate 19 at G. G contains all information such as time, place, external factors in relation to r, and internal factors in relation to r. The following is absurd: Where the reality/truth is such that r is absolutely random, G is wholly irrelevant to r. It is absurd because it is the internal/inherent nature of r that determines whether r is truly random or not. So G cannot be irrelevant to r.

Let’s say q contains less information than G (it includes everything except internal factors in relation to r). Where r is generating its numbers such that q has no effect on the reality/truth in relation to how r is generating its numbers (in this case randomly), then r can be said to be generating its numbers in a random manner. Where a specific location results in r generating a specific number (for example, if r always generates the number 19 in the kitchen), then r is not a wholly random number generator because it is determined to generate the number 19 in the kitchen. Thus, where a change in r’s location alters how r generates its numbers, then r’s manner of generating its numbers is disrupted or changed by a change in its location. But a change in location can only meaningfully impact r’s manner of generating its numbers where there is some meaningful thing about this new location that effects r’s manner of generating its numbers. It also means there either was, or there has come to be something internal/inherent about r that clicks with this new location, such that r no longer generates its numbers in a completely random manner. The former is not absurd in any way. The latter can either be viewed as absurd, or non-absurd. It is absurd in the sense that going from absolute randomness to any level of determinedness, means the potential/possibility to become determined was actually always inherently there. It is not absurd in the sense that r was truly/absolutely random because it had 0 inherent potential for determinedness, but some external force changed it internally or inherently such that when its location was changed, it would click with that location, whereas before, it wouldn’t.

So long as its interior angles add up to exactly 180 degrees, x is absolutely/perfectly/truly triangular. So long as it is generating numbers in a purely random manner, r is absolutely/perfectly/truly random in generating its numbers. It is determined that the semantics of random and triangular are both indestructible/immutable (as are all other semantics in Existence, and of course Existence itself). It is also determined that a triangular thing, or a random number generator, are both mutable or destructible.

For God, it is determined that determined number generator d, will always generate 19. In this case, d is maximally determined and q is irrelevant to d’s inherent nature (unless of course d’s inherent nature is changed to something else, but by q here I mean external factors clicking with d’s inherent nature, not changing it).

The last three paragraphs show that you can have a maximally random number generator, and a maximally determined number generator. You can also have all that is in between randomness and determinedness. The last three paragraphs show this because the denial of their meaningfulness, leads to an inconsistency in semantics. Consider the following spectrum:

random——————-semi-random/semi-determined——————-determined

The closest to random semi-random number generator (call any semi-random number generator s-r), will almost always generate numbers randomly in an absolute/complete sense (what I mean by absolute here will hopefully become clear further on). There will be one q wherein which it will generate a specific number (let’s say the number 19) purely as a result of this specific q. Call this one specific q “qx” or “external circumstance x”, but don’t take it as an absolute specific (so instead of it being one absolutely specific Sunday, it is all hypothetically possible Sundays on September 19th 2021 in world w). This nearly maximally random s-r, will always generate 19 in/at/on qx, but will generate randomly in all other qs (external circumstances). But perhaps it can get even more random (or closer to randomness if we are to be absolute with regards to our standards).

Instead of s-r being determined to generate its number 19 in qx, it is instead determined to generate any of its numbers except the number 19. Let’s unpack this: Suppose s-r only generates one number a day (it is guaranteed to generate one number a day). Further suppose qx is Sunday, and qxS is any absolutely specific qx Sunday. So there is one qx, and an endless number of qxSs. If we say s-r has a 1% chance of generating any number but 19, and a 99% chance of generating any number randomly in each qxS, then that is necessarily absurd due to the following: Unlike each qx (which encompasses an endless number of qxSs), each qxS does not encompass anything other than itself. One qxS, one assigned number to that qxS. An endless number of qxSs, an endless number of numbers (one assigned to each qxS with the exception of the number 19). It is for this reason we are able to meaningfully/truly say “s-r can generate any number, but at qx it will generate any number but 19″.

If we say s-r has a 99% chance of generating randomly (it can generate any of its endless numbers) and a 1% chance of generating semi-randomly (it can generate any of its numbers except the number 19) in/at qx (which is one layer higher than qxS), then that is absurd because we need to be one layer higher than qx for this to be possible. We need something that encompasses an endless number of qxs such that in 1% of the qxs, it generates any of its numbers but 19, whilst in the other 99% of the qxs, it generates any of its numbers.

I should perhaps highlight here that a number generator that is able to generate only two numbers but does so in an absolutely random manner, is still absolutely random relative to its potential. However, its unpredictability or randomness is not with as much depth and breadth as a number generator that generates three numbers in an absolutely random manner (because it is potentially less random to an external observer in the sense that it has less numbers to generate in an absolutely random manner). Thus, whilst both number generators can be said to be absolutely random in the manner in which they are generating their numbers relative to their potential, the latter (the one with three numbers) is harder to correctly predict with regards to what number it will generate next (not with regards to what are the odds of it generating the number 1 when it can only generate the numbers 1 and 2). There is less room for error regarding the former, hence the justification for describing it as being easier to predict despite it being absolutely random. Of course, neither of these two random number generators are absolutely/objectively/completely/truly completely random (their inherent potential is limited due to the limited number of numbers they encompass) because the potential for greater randomness exists in Existence (not in them). Only a number generator that possesses all possible numbers (as opposed to just two or three) can (but not necessarily will) be truly completely random in generating numbers.

The closest to determined semi-determined number generator (call any semi-determined number generator s-d), will almost always generate the number 20. Suppose a number generator generates 20 in all qs, but at qx it generates 19. We cannot describe this number generator as being random in any way (so it is not an s-d at all). It is fully determined to generate 20 and 19 in a determined manner.

Call Sunday 19/9/2021 qx, and any absolutely specific qx qxS. Where s-d generates either 20 or 19 in qx, then p% of qx (that’s p percent of all qxSs) consists of 19, whilst the other percentage consists of 20. Hence the semi-randomness. With this being in place, we can describe this number generator as an s-d. The smaller the p%, the closer s-d is to being maximally determined in generating 20. Put differently, the greater the odds of s-d generating 20 at qx, the closer it is to being absolutely determined in generating 20.

Time travel

Since the past cannot occur in the future, the future cannot occur in the past. This clearly proves that time travel is absurd. If time travel is to have any semantically consistent or relevant value in relation to its label, then I believe the following is it:

From the present to the past: The present me, can enter another world that is identical to the world the past me occupied, and then start interacting with it.

From the future to the present: If a future “me” comes to me now and tells me that he is me from the future, I would know a priori that he doesn’t mean from the same world. The future “me” from the other world, is from a world identical to the one I would have found myself in had the future “me” not interfered. Though we’re not truly/really the same being (just as no two right angled triangles in two different locations are truly/really the same triangle, even though they are internally semantically identical), the future “me” a posteriori knows what kind of life I would have had had he not interfered. This a posteriori knowledge is possible here because everything about our two worlds is identical, right up until the point the future “me” interacts with me. Even if the future “me” travelled to my world as an invisible observer and did not interact with me, the two worlds are no longer identical. In one version/hypothetical possibility of my world (or in one possible truth/reality in relation to the world I occupy), a/the future “me” is present as an invisible observer, whereas in another version, the future “me” is not present as an invisible observer.

So, where the future “me” does interact with me, it is no longer hypothetically possible for me to be identical to the future “me”. Where the future “me” is just an invisible observer that does not alter the course of events in my world beyond just being there invisibly, I will continue to be internally identical to the future “me”. Given the infinite regress that can follow from this, there will have to be one original “me” that never had a future “me” observe “itself”.

From the past into the future: The same principle applies but in reverse. If a past “me” comes to me now and tells me he’s from the past, I would at first think that he is probably mistaken because I have no past memories of visiting a “me” that I am identical to now. But just as I necessarily stop being identical to the future “me” after he interacts with me, the past “me” necessarily stopped being identical to me after he differed to my past. Clearly, both the past “me” and the future “me” are not truly me. Despite this, it appears that I have a closer resemblance to the future “me” because I would have definitely become identical to the future “me” had the future “me” been entirely invisible when travelling back in time to my world to see me. The past “me” would not have become identical to me unless he somehow travelled to the future my world to see me as an invisible observer, and then travelled back in time to the world he came from, and then suffered an adequate amount of amnesia. This would then mean that the present me identically did all these things but just can’t remember. No amnesia is required of a future “me” for us to be identical. All other things being equal, the more memories I have of myself, the more I am me (or the greater I am in me-ness).

For any given subject, real happiness, fulfilment, satisfaction, and pleasure, is better than pretend/illusory versions of those things (though some level of happiness and satisfaction is better than no level of happiness or satisfaction. Thus, it is better to be somewhat happy and satisfied, then to not exist at all). The reverse of this is also possible: For any given subject, real unhappiness, anguish, grief, meaninglessness, and suffering is worse than pretend/illusory versions of those things. If God put me in hell to satisfy Perfection/God/Justice, then surely I would rather not exist (unless I believed there would be an end to it and that something good would follow it such that it outweighed all the bad before it). If I was mildly unhappy and unsatisfied, and there was never any way for this to turn into something good (like mild happiness or potent happiness), then it is better for me that I don’t exist at all. If some other being is benefitting from my suffering, then it is better for him that I exist. Whether this is right or wrong, depends on whether I’m objectively good or evil (I have discussed good and evil in all but one of my posts that proceed this post). It also depends on whether he is objectively good or evil. He does not deserve to be benefitted if he is evil, and I do not deserve to suffer if I am good. Nothing is worse than seeing good sacrificed, traded, or betrayed for evil. The inverse of this is perfection/good (as in it’s perfection for evil to suffer unhappiness and for good to enjoy happiness. Why else would it be good to be good and evil to be evil?). Some are willing to commit to the former (some more strong-willingly than others), some to the latter.

An Attempt at a True Theory of Everything (Part 2: The Nature of Existence)

Last updated 9/11/2021

This post consists of the following parts: “That which is necessarily at least as real as us”, “Infinity”, “Omni”, “The omnis that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner”, and “Perfection”.

That which is necessarily at least as real as us

We don’t partially exist in Existence and partially exist in non-Existence. The notion of an existing thing being partly in Existence and partly in non-Existence, is absurd. Thus, we (whoever or whatever we may really be) completely exist in Existence (completely in the sense that no part of us is/exists in non-Existence, not in the sense that we are truly complete beings/existents. Only Existence truly completely exists. Everything else that exists, completely exists as a part of Existence, not as Existence Itself). It is absurd to say we don’t truly/indubitably/completely exist in Existence. I acknowledge that who or what we really are is dubitable, but us (or at least me or whatever I may be) being in Existence is not dubitable. We are indubitably aware that we are in Existence (just as we are indubitably aware that triangles have three sides).

It is impossible for us to have no ties to that which is truly/completely/absolutely real because all worlds or realities (dream or otherwise), must be rooted in that which is truly/completely/really real. How can that which does not truly exist, independently give rise to that which truly exists? Similarly, how can that which is not truly real, independently give rise to that which is really/truly real? Or how can that which is less real, give rise to that which is more real than itself independently of that which is completely/perfectly/absolutely real? It cannot as it would amount to something coming from nothing. This shows that there definitely is a true reality (or a completely real being/existent).

Consider the semantic of ‘triangle’. The triangle I drew without a ruler is not as triangular as the triangle I drew with a ruler. Now consider the semantics of ‘unicorn’ and ‘Existence’. We know that one is necessarily at least as real as we are (as in it exists with at least as much realness as we do), but we don’t know if the other is as equally real as us or not. We know that Existence is at least as real as us simply because all beings and realities exist in Existence (and as a result of Existence). So nothing is more real than Existence (just as nothing is more triangular than a perfect triangle). Unicorns don’t have the same ontological necessity. They do not necessarily exist in all realities in the same way that Existence does. Their not-equal-to-us realness in our reality does not necessarily lead to contradictions, whereas Existence’s not-equal-to-us realness in our reality is necessarily contradictory. The only reason we’re as real as we are, is because Existence is at least as real as we are. Zeus, Zorro, or unicorns, certainly are or certainly aren’t at least as real as us (as in they either are or aren’t physically in our universe, or some other equally real world/universe). We don’t know which.

There are semantics that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner (true infinity and true omnipresence are examples of this), and there are semantics that logically denote Existence but not in an absolute manner (so things that are in Existence such as unicorns and humans are examples of this). As this post is focused on the nature of Existence, I will go through all semantics that we have access to, and distinguish those that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner from those that don’t.

Infinity

Since true infinity denotes Existence, and Existence is at least as real as we are, that which is truly infinite is necessarily at least as real as we are. We are encompassed by Existence. We are encompassed by that which is completely/truly infinite. Another semantic that clearly denotes Existence, is omnipresent. Omnipresent = that which is present everywhere. Only Existence truly exists everywhere, therefore, only Existence is truly omnipresent. Anything else that we describe as being omnipresent (such as water in a swimming pool, or the air on our planet) is not truly omnipresent. If it’s not truly omnipresent, then it’s semantically inconsistent to describe it as being omnipresent. It is semi-omnipresent or imperfectly omnipresent perhaps. Given this logic, semi-infinite is more appropriate as a label for things that are not truly/actually/completely infinite (only that which has no beginning and no end can be said to be truly infinite. If x is immortal but had a beginning, then x is not infinite in life span. It is semi-infinite).

That which is infinite (Existence), makes semi-infinite worlds/realities/existents/beings hypothetically possible. It’s possible for me to be in a world and forever move forwards within it. It’s possible for there to be a semi-infinite library that contains a semi-infinite number of books. There can be no infinite libraries because only Existence is infinite, and there can only be one omnipresent or infinite being/existent. But given the nature of infinity, there can be an endless number of semi-infinite libraries each with a semi-infinite set of books. Bigger semi-infinite libraries can contain more than one semi-infinite set of books (or a bigger semi-infinite set). See the following post for more on infinity: The solution to Russell’s paradox and the absurdity of more than one infinity.

Omni

We’ve discussed one meaningful “omni” concept so far. Are there other meaningful “omni” concepts? Consider the concept of “omnishape”. Given the semantics that are available in Existence a priori, and how the English language has labelled them a posteriori, three definitions come to my mind regarding this word: 1) Something that is all the shapes at the same time. 2) Something that encompasses all the shapes. 3) Something that can turn into any shape imaginable. The first definition is absurd because no singular shape can be two different shapes at the same time. The second definition is true of Existence in that Existence encompasses all shapes imaginable. An omnishape existent (an existent that can turn into any shape imaginable) is also not absurd (nor meaningless or unknown). Therefore, the third definition is also semantically consistent.

What other meaningful omni concepts can we think of? Consider omniworld. Again, three definitions come to my mind: 1) something that is all the worlds at the same time. 2) something that encompasses all the worlds. 3) something that can turn into any world imaginable. Omniworld is pretty much the same as omnishape but on a larger, more complex scale. Again, the first definition is absurd, whilst the latter two definitions are true. We can try omnibook or omnicolour and they will logically generate the same definitional pattern with the first being false (semantically inconsistent), and the latter two being true (semantically consistent).

We a posteriori believe that water in our world is made up of atoms. With this belief/semantic in mind, in order for water to be semi-omnipresent, atoms must also be equally (if not more) semi-omnipresent. In other words, in order for omniwater to be at all meaningful, omniatom must be true (because water is made up of atoms). And even if we talk about water that’s not made up of atoms, it’s still made up of whatever Existence is made up of (which is neither nothing nor water).

Logically, we need an item that is between any and every meaningful item except itself. That item is the infinitesimal. The infinitesimal separates all existing things from each other except itself. Nothing can separate one infinitesimal from another. If x is not separated from x by anything other than x, then x is just one x. x is Existence. If we say concepts such as omniatom denote atoms occupying all of Existence in an omnipresent manner, then we would be rejecting infinitesimal as that which everything is made up of or sustained by. Whilst metals, water, and every other imaginable thing is made up of infinitesimal, the reverse does not hold true. The infinitesimal cannot stop being infinitesimal, whereas water can cease to be water by changing into something else. Since the omnipresent itself cannot change (despite things it sustains being susceptible to change), this shows us that any semantic other than infinitesimal, will leave us with an absurd description of what Existence is made up of or refers to. 

Only that which is infinite is omnipresent. Infinitesimals are is omnipresent. Existence is omnipresent. It’s like in relation to us, infinity is the external aspect of Existence, whilst infinitesimal is the internal aspect of Existence. I am in Existence, but there is no non-Existence in me, and there is no end to the Existence in me or outside of me. Thus, I am in Existence (infinity), and Existence (infinitesimal) is in me. In other words, I am fully encompassed, sustained, and separated from other beings/things/existents, by Existence.

We’ve discussed a few omni concepts. An explanation was given with regards to how/why they are meaningful. I will now focus on omnipotence and omniscience.

The omnis that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner

Omnipotent = that which can do all that is doable

Omniscient = that which knows all that is knowable

One cannot do all that is doable without having reach or access to all of Existence (if I have no reach or access to x, then I have no power over x). Just as I cannot count to infinity or reach infinity, I cannot expand to the point of infinity to replace that which is infinite. How is this replacement going to take place? Is the original Existence (or infinite being/existent) going to go into non-Existence in order to make room for me to take Its place?

Only the omnipresent has reach/access to all of Existence (because It is Existence). Furthermore, nothing can take the place of Existence or become Existence because nothing can become omnipresent from a non-omnipresent state (just as nothing can become infinite from a non-infinite state). This shows that one cannot be omnipotent without being omnipresent. Similarly, one cannot know all that is knowable without being omnipresent. How can one store or be in possession of an endless amount of data, knowledge, or hypothetical possibilities, without being infinite? Also, how can one know what it’s like to be omnipotent or omnipresent without being omnipresent? One cannot.

The previous two paragraphs show that omnipotence and omniscience logically can’t be attributes of anything other than the infinite or the omnipresent (Existence). So whilst semantics such as ‘unicorn’ or ‘me choosing to do psychology instead of philosophy in 2009’ can all be said to be meaningful as a result of being hypothetical possibilities (or time sensitive hypothetical possibilities in the case of the latter semantic example), omnipotence and omniscience cannot be accounted for in the same way. Again, this is because nothing can become omnipresent from a non-omnipresent state. With the previous two paragraphs in mind, this logically means that nothing can become omnipotent/omniscient from a non-omnipotent/non-omniscient state (because nothing can become omnipresent from a non-omnipresent state). Also, that which is omnipresent cannot magically shift from being non-omnipotent/non-omniscient to being omnipotent/omniscient as that would be a case of something coming from nothing. Where would Existence (the omnipresent) have found the potential to be omniscient from if it was non-omniscient? Non-Existence?

If the omnipresent is not omnipotent, then omnipotence is hypothetically impossible (as is omniscience). Therefore, either Existence is necessarily omnipotent and omniscient (which is the only way we can meaningfully account for how omnipotence and omniscience are meaningful), or, Existence is necessarily non-omnipotent/non-omniscient (which means omnipotence and omniscience are absurd concepts like round-squares). It’s not just a matter of hypothetical possibility or time sensitive hypothetical possibility. Where omnipotence and omniscience are meaningful/rational (semantically consistent) concepts, they must be true of Existence in an absolute sense. If they are true of Existence in an absolute sense, then an omnipotent/omniscient being is necessarily at least as real as we are.

Some might argue that naturalism is a meaningful concept. Since it is a meaningful concept, it is true of Existence. If concept A is the negation of another concept B from Existence as a whole, then A is a contradictory concept provided that B is a meaningful concept. On the other hand, if B is absurd/contradictory, then A is meaningful. For example, non-naturalism (the negation of naturalism) is true if naturalism is contradictory, and vice versa.

Consider what I will call “finitism”. The finitist will argue that Existence is finite (just as the naturalist will argue that Existence is non-omnipotent/non-omniscient). If the finitist is to be rationally/semantically consistent and avoid the problem of something coming from nothing, he will argue that infinity is absurd, therefore, Existence is necessarily finite. Similarly, if the naturalist is to be rationally consistent and avoid the problem of something coming from nothing, he will argue that omnipotence and omniscience are contradictory/absurd, therefore, Existence is necessarily non-omnipotent/non-omniscient. Finitism is purely a product of the negation of infinity. Since infinity is not a contradictory concept, finitism is a contradictory concept. Similarly, naturalism is purely a product of the negation of divine attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience. If omnipotence and omniscience are not contradictory (which the ontological argument (or the true cogito) I outline in my 5th post shows that they cannot be), then naturalism is a contradictory concept.

Finitism leaves us without an explanation for why infinity is meaningful. Naturalism leaves us without an explanation for why omnipotence and omniscience are meaningful. It is important to note that just as infinity is not the negation of finitism (although this is a logical consequence of it being meaningful but not its actual meaning), omnipotence and omniscience are also not the negation of naturalism (despite this being a logical consequence of them being meaningful but not their actual meanings). Nihilism, finitism, and naturalism, are all purely negations of other meaningful concepts. Infinity does not deny the meaningfulness of finite. It denies finiteness as being all there is to Existence by virtue of itself being meaningful. Similarly, omnipotence and omniscience do not deny the meaningfulness of there being natural laws in Existence. They deny natural laws as being all there is to Existence by virtue of themselves being meaningful.

Perfection

The final concept to consider when reflecting on the nature of Existence, is perfection. Perfection = that which no greater than can be conceived of (or that which cannot get/be any better). There is that which is truly perfect, and there is that which we wrongly labelled as perfect. For example, the phrase “perfect human” is absurd because the best possible human is not that which no greater than can be conceived of. How can the best possible human be considered as perfect when better than it can be conceived? This shows that phrases such as “the perfect human” or “the perfect house” amount to absurdly saying the perfect imperfect being/existent. This is no different to absurdly saying the omnipresent non-omnipresent being/existent.

A perfect triangle is truly/perfectly/completely triangular. That which is truly perfect (or exists truly perfectly) is truly/perfectly/completely perfect. In this post I have taken to being absolute with semantics. As in I have opted to view only the truly infinite as infinite. Consistency would have me only view that which is truly/perfectly triangular as triangular, whilst that which is imperfectly triangular (an imperfect triangle) as semi-triangular. Similarly, I will view that which is truly perfect as perfect, and view that which is “perfect” but not truly perfect, as semi-perfect (the best that it can be in relation to its non-perfect self or context). There was an a priori answer to what is omnipresent. Is there an a priori answer to what is perfect?

Objectively, which is better: Existence being the best that it can be, or, Existence not being as good as it can be? If I wanted to be as good as I can be, and, make sure everyone gets what they truly/perfectly deserve (including myself), would I not need to be omnipotent and omniscient? What would make one happier, more fulfilled, and more in awe of its own existing/being? Being perfect (a perfect Existence), or an imperfect Existence?

Whatever subject, object, world, or being you give me, it can be made better by being/existing in a perfect Existence (of course, the only exception to this is the perfect Existence Itself because it cannot be/exist any better). The “perfect” life that you want in the “perfect” galaxy, is made better by being/existing in a perfect Existence. Do you want your “perfect” book, life, or galaxy to be/exist in a perfect Existence (where everyone gets what they truly deserve), or an imperfect one? Thus, your “perfect” life is not perfect if it is/exists in an imperfect Existence because it can be made better by being in a perfect Existence. If your “reasoning” is such that you prefer to be in an imperfect Existence instead of a perfect Existence, then you are evil/irrational/inconsistent. Only evil people favour an Existence with injustice over an Existence with no injustice. Only irrational people think maximum, consistent, meaningful, fulfilling happiness can be possible in an imperfect Existence. Only irrational/evil/contradictory people think it’s good to be evil. Good being evil is as absurd as triangle being square.

Clearly, the greatest potentiality in terms of goodness lies within a perfect Existence. Any lesser being/existent such as a galaxy or a human, cannot be as good as Existence. Just as there can be nothing more present than an omnipresent being/existent (Existence), there can be nothing better than a perfect being/existent (Existence). Therefore, just as only Existence can semantically/meaningfully qualify as being omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and infinite, only Existence can semantically qualify as being perfect. How can something be perfect if it is not omnipotent? And how can something be omnipotent if it is not infinite/Existence/omnipresent? Most importantly, how can something be perfect if Existence is imperfect? How can anything exist perfectly in an imperfect existence? It cannot. Objectively speaking, there is no greater truth than ‘Existence is perfect’.

Is perfection (or God) at least as real as we are? Yes because perfection cannot logically denote anything other than the omnipresent, and the omnipresent is at least as real as we are. The proceeding paragraphs attempt to further illustrate this truth.

One might ask: What if Existence’s desires were evil or amoral? The short answer is then It wouldn’t be perfect. We can account for the meaningfulness of the concepts of imperfect and evil because there are imperfect and evil beings in Existence. How would we account for the meaningfulness of the concept of perfect if Existence was imperfect? This is not unlike asking how would we account for the meaningfulness of the concept of infinity if Existence was finite? In both cases we wouldn’t be able to because we are fully contingent on Existence and there is no non-Existence for us to derive anything that is independent of Existence from. If Existence was finite or imperfect, then infinity and perfection would be absurd concepts. They would be impossibilities (see my previous post for a more detailed defence of this). We are aware that infinity, omnipresent, and perfect are meaningful concepts. The only way to rationally/semantically/meaningfully account for these semantics, is to acknowledge/recognise them as attributes of Existence. We cannot be described as wholly rational (or semantically/meaningfully consistent) beings if we view Existence as finite or imperfect.

Round-squares are impossible. The concept of “round-square” is an absurd concept. A person who says he is 100% sure that Existence is not perfect is an absurd person. A person who definitively rejects God (and I am talking about that which I have outlined here (the infinite and omnipresent). I am not talking about Zeus or some other non-omnipresent or non-perfect being/existent) is an absurd person. Of course, if a person does not understand God (the omnipresent) at all, then he has not rejected God at all (even if he says he has) because he has not understood God for him to qualify as someone who has meaningfully rejected God. You cannot meaningfully reject that which is not meaningful to you.

For perfection to be meaningful, it must at least be a hypothetical possibility. That which has imperfect desires, or even the slightest bit of potential for an imperfect desire, is not perfect. If the omnipresent ever had imperfect desires, or, if It had even the slightest bit of potential for an imperfect desire, then perfection would be hypothetically impossible. Therefore, the omnipresent’s desires being evil or amoral cannot be true. 

Perhaps it is hypothetically possible for the omnipresent to do/exist imperfectly (just as it is hypothetically possible for me to gauge out my own eyes). This is false. With Existence, doing imperfectly is certainly guaranteed to never happen. With me, gouging out my own eyes is almost certainly guaranteed to never happen. I can think of extremely wild and unlikely hypothetical scenarios where I might gauge out my own eyes, but I cannot think of any hypothetical scenario where Existence would go against Its own perfect desires to compromise Its own perfection. It is omniscient, so It can’t miscalculate or do mistakenly (whereas I can). Its desires cannot shift from being perfect to imperfect because It doesn’t have any potential for an imperfect desire (if It did, then by definition/semantics/truth It wouldn’t be perfect. Existence will never desire to sacrifice the greatest good (Itself/God) for a lesser good. Nor will It desire to sacrifice a greater good for a lesser good. Such desires are impossible of a perfect being, but they are not impossible of an imperfect being). So how can It possibly do imperfectly? Having said that, I can conceive of Jesus being crucified. How do I reconcile this rationally?

Perhaps I should say Existence can do imperfectly, but won’t do imperfectly. But can I really/truly conceive of Jesus being crucified when the premises I have are ‘Jesus is righteous’ and ‘Existence is perfect’? Surely if I see Jesus being crucified I must either conclude Existence is evil, or Jesus is evil (unless he enjoys being crucified and no harm comes to him from it. But then can it meaningfully be called crucifixion? If Jesus looks as though he is being harmed but he is not actually being harmed, can it really be said that he is being harmed?). I cannot hold onto both premises at the same time. It would be like believing in the imperfect-perfect Existence or the married-bachelor. So which premise do I hold onto?

I can think of extremely wild and unlikely hypothetical scenarios where crucifixion does not cause Jesus any physical pain, or that he is simply insufficient in his righteousness such that it is perfection for him to be crucified. What I cannot do is think of any non-absurd hypothetical scenarios where Existence would go against Its own perfect desires to compromise Its own perfection. Again, It is omniscient so It can’t miscalculate or do mistakenly. Its desires cannot shift from being perfect to imperfect. So how can It possibly do/will imperfectly?

Clearly, Existence won’t do imperfectly. Can we say Existence can’t do imperfectly? If Existence wanted to crucify a righteous woman, It could because It is omnipotent. It is impossible for Existence to want this because It is perfect (hence the impossibility of such an occurrence). Thus, the omnipresent cannot become non-omnipresent, and the perfect will not will imperfectly or become imperfect. It can be said with certainty that the perfect being is at least as real as we are. Though I acknowledge that there are evil and unjust beings in Existence, there is certainly no evil or injustice in Existence because all such beings get what they deserve (simply because Existence is perfect). In my next post I discuss this in detail.

In my previous post I asked whether or not there could be premises in place that could deprive us of the rational authority to say “our Joe Biden flying is an actual hypothetical possibility”. The only premise that can render this as being absurd, is that it would amount to an imperfect Existence. Put differently, the only premise that can render this as being absurd, is that it would contradict the will of God. This also holds true for me being able to raise my arm in the next second. It holds true for everything because God is omnipotent. So long as it doesn’t contradict perfection (the will of God), it’s hypothetically possible.

Just as triangles can’t be anything other than three-sided, Existence/Being can’t refer to anything other than God (the infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent towards good, omnimalevolent towards evil…).

Bibliography

Books

Clarke, D. M., Rene Descartes, Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, (2003), London, England: Penguin.

Clayton, P., The Problem of God in Modern Thought, (2000), Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Kenny, A., Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, (1968), Bristol: Thoemmes Press.

Razavi, M. A., Suhrawardi and the school of illumination, (1997), Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press

Online sources

Ayatullahi, H. R., “Mulla Sadra’s Argument of the Righteous and a Critical Study of Kant and Hume’s Views on the Proofs of God’s Existence” Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute (2009) URL = <http://www.mullasadra.org/new_site/english/Paper%20Bank/Knowledge%20of%20GOD/Ayatullahi.htm&gt;.

Brueckner, T., “Skepticism and Content Externalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/&gt;.

Chakravartty, A., “Scientific Realism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/scientific-realism/&gt;.

Comesaña, Juan and Peter Klein, “Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/skepticism/&gt;.

Culp, J., “Panentheism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/panentheism/&gt;.

Davidson, M., “God and Other Necessary Beings”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/god-necessary-being/&gt;.

De Pierris, G., and Friedman, M., “Kant and Hume on Causality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/kant-hume-causality/&gt;.

Dowden, E., “Time” Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2013) URL = <http://www.iep.utm.edu/time/&gt;.
Earl, D., “Concepts” Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2007), URL = <http://www.iep.utm.edu/concepts/#H5&gt;.

Fisher, S., “Pierre Gassendi”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/gassendi/&gt;.

Grier, M., “Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-metaphysics/&gt;.

Guleserian, T., “Can Moral Perfection be an Essential Attribute?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Dec., 1985), pp. 219-241, Published by: International Phenomenological Society, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107354 .Accessed: 17/07/2013 00:06

Hoffman, J., and Rosenkrantz, G., “Omnipotence”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/omnipotence/&gt;.

Hofweber, T., “Logic and Ontology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/logic-ontology/&gt;.

Huggett, N., “Zeno’s Paradoxes”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/paradox-zeno/&gt;.

Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Text derived from the Harvard Classics Volume 37, 1910 P.F. Collier & Son., This web edition published by eBooks@Adelaide., Rendered into HTML by Steve Thomas., URL = <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92e/&gt;.

Hylton, Peter, “Willard van Orman Quine”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/quine/&gt;.

Van Inwagen, P., “Metaphysics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/metaphysics/&gt;.

Khlentzos, D., “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/realism-sem-challenge/&gt;.

Klein, P., “Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/skepticism/&gt;.

Margolis, E., and Laurence, S., “Concepts”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/concepts/&gt;.

Miller, A., “Realism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/realism/&gt;.

Moore, G. E., “Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” Principia Ethica, (1903) URL = < http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.10#s10p1&gt;.
Morris, W. E., “David Hume”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/hume/&gt;.

Morriston, W., “Craig on the Actual Infinite”, URL = <https://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/craig-on-the-actual-infinite.pdf&gt;

Newman, L., “Descartes’ Epistemology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/descartes-epistemology/&gt;.

Nolan, L., “Descartes’ Ontological Argument”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/descartes-ontological/&gt;.

Oppy, G., “Ontological Arguments”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ontological-arguments/&gt;.

Papineau, D., “Naturalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/&gt;.

Rizvi, S., “Mulla Sadra”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-sadra/&gt;.

Russell, P., “Hume on Religion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/hume-religion/&gt;.

Skirry, J., “René Descartes (1596—1650): Overview”, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2008), URL = <http://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/&gt;.

Slowik, E., “Hume and the Perception of Spatial Magnitude Source, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 355-373 Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232222 .Accessed: 23/07/2013 10:26

Smith, K., “Descartes’ Life and Works”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/descartes-works/&gt;.

Vogt, K., “Ancient Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/skepticism-ancient/&gt;.

Wierenga, E., “Omnipresence”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/omnipresence/&gt;.

Other sources:

The Quran

The Bible

Wikipedia

Youtube

Google

corpus.quran.com

http://www.studyquran.co.uk

http://www.biblehub.com

The source of all sources:

God/Existence