An Attempt at a True Theory of Everything (Part 2: The Nature of Existence)

This post consists of the following parts: “That which is necessarily at least as real as us”, “Infinity”, “Omni”, “The omnis that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner”, and “Perfection”.

That which is necessarily at least as real as us

We don’t partially exist in Existence and partially exist in non-Existence. The notion of an existing thing being partly in Existence and partly in non-Existence, is absurd. Thus, we (whoever or whatever we may really be) completely exist in Existence (completely in the sense that no part of us is/exists in non-Existence, not in the sense that we are complete beings/existents). It is absurd to say we don’t truly/indubitably/completely exist in Existence. I acknowledge that who or what we really are is dubitable, but us being in Existence is not dubitable. We are indubitably aware that we are in Existence (just as we are indubitably aware that triangles have three sides).

It is impossible for us to have no ties to that which is truly/completely/absolutely real because all worlds or realities (dream or otherwise), must be rooted in that which is truly/completely/really real. How can that which does not truly exist, independently give rise to that which truly exists? Similarly, how can that which is not truly real, independently give rise to that which is really/truly real? Or how can that which is less real, give rise to that which is more real than itself, independently of that which is truly/completely/perfectly/absolutely real? It cannot. This shows that there definitely/absolutely is a true reality, or a completely real being/existent.

Consider the semantic of ‘triangle’. The triangle I drew without a ruler, is not as triangular as the triangle I drew with a ruler. Now consider the semantics of ‘unicorn’ and ‘Existence’. We know that one is necessarily at least as real as we are (as in it exists with at least as much realness as we do), but we don’t know if the other is as equally real as us or not. We know that Existence is at least as real as us simply because all beings and realities exist in Existence, and as a result of Existence. So nothing is more real than Existence (just as nothing is more triangular than a perfect triangle). Unicorns don’t have the same ontological necessity. They do not necessarily exist in all realities in the same way that Existence does. Their not-equal-to-us realness in our reality does not necessarily lead to contradictions (semantical inconsistencies), whereas Existence’s not-equal-to-us realness in our reality is necessarily contradictory. The only reason we’re as real as we are, is because Existence is at least as real as we are. Zeus, Zorro, or unicorns, certainly are or certainly aren’t at least as real as us (as in they either are or aren’t physically in our universe, or some other equally real world/universe). We don’t know which.

There are semantics that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner (true infinity and Existence are examples of this), and there are semantics that logically denote Existence but not in an absolute manner (so things that are in Existence such as unicorns and humans are examples of this). As this post is focused on the nature of Existence, I will go through all semantics that we have access to, and distinguish those that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner, from those that don’t.

Infinity

Since true infinity denotes Existence, and Existence is at least as real as we are, that which is truly infinite is necessarily at least as real as we are. We are encompassed by Existence. We are encompassed by that which is completely/truly infinite. Another semantic that clearly denotes Existence, is omnipresent. Omnipresent = that which is present everywhere. Only Existence exists everywhere (or is present everywhere), therefore, only Existence is truly omnipresent. Anything else that we describe as being omnipresent (such as water in a swimming pool, or the air on our planet) is not truly omnipresent. If it’s not truly omnipresent, then it’s semantically inconsistent to describe it as being omnipresent. It is semi-omnipresent or imperfectly omnipresent perhaps. Given this logic, semi-infinite is more appropriate as a label for things that are not truly/actually/completely infinite (only that which has no beginning and no end can be said to be truly infinite. If x is immortal but had a beginning, then x is not infinite in life span. It is semi-infinite).

That which is infinite (Existence), makes semi-infinite worlds/realities/existents hypothetically possible. It’s possible for me to be in a world and forever move forwards within it. It’s possible for there to be a semi-infinite library that contains a semi-infinite number of books. There can be no infinite libraries because only Existence is infinite, and there can only be one omnipresent or infinite being/existent. But given the nature of infinity, there can be an endless number of semi-infinite libraries, each with a semi-infinite set of books. Bigger semi-infinite libraries can contain more than one semi-infinite set of books (or a bigger semi-infinite set).

A finite library can contain a finite number of the endless number of books that exist in Existence. Books can be added to or taken away from this library. If a finite number of books are added to this library, the total number of books it contains will still be finite, but this new finite quantity will be greater than before. Similarly, a semi-infinite library can contain a semi-finite number of books of the endless number of books that exist in Existence. Books can be added to or taken away from this library too. If a semi-infinite number of books are added, the total number of books in the library will still be semi-infinite, but this new semi-infinite quantity will be greater than before. If instead a finite number of books were added to this library, then this library will still contain more books than before because it now contains a semi-infinite set of books, plus a finite set of books. The semi-infinite number of books will remain the same, but the total number of books in the library will have increased as a result of adding a finite number of books to it. Just to reiterate, semi-infinity is not equal to infinity in quantity. You can add to semi-infinity, but you cannot add to infinity.

If a finite library was big enough, and we were mortals spending all our lives trying to get to the end of it (but never actually getting there), it’s possible for us to mistake it for a semi-infinite library. Just as a sufficiently big enough finite can resemble something semi-infinite to some, perhaps a sufficiently big enough semi-infinity can resemble infinity to some. The being/existent with the greatest quantitative detail, capacity, or potential, is infinite in detail, capacity, or potential (Existence is like this). A picture or video game that is rich in graphical detail, tends to take up more space than a less detailed one. A playstation 2 game consists of about 1-2 GB of data. I’ve seen a playstation 4 game take up nearly 100 GB of data. A playstation 4 game can never run on a playstation 2. To my understanding, this is because playstation 2 hardware is inadequate with regards to processing the large amounts of data inherent in a playstation 4 game. A powerful enough pc can run any previous generation games (as well as current generation games). What I mean to illustrate with this example is that whilst the infinite can sustain infinitely, the semi-infinite or the finite cannot.

Omni

We’ve discussed one meaningful “omni” concept so far. Are there other meaningful “omni” concepts? Consider the concept of “omnishape”. Given the semantics that are available in Existence a priori, and how the English language has labelled them a posteriori, three definitions come to my mind regarding this concept: 1) something that is all the shapes at the same time. 2) something that encompasses all the shapes. 3) something that can turn into any shape imaginable. The first definition is absurd because no singular shape can be two different shapes at the same time. The second definition is true of Existence in that Existence encompasses all shapes imaginable (which is the same as saying all meaningful shapes are encompassed by Existence). An omnishape existent (an existent that can turn into any shape imaginable) is also not absurd (nor meaningless or unknown). Therefore, the third definition is also semantically consistent.

What other meaningful omni concepts can we think of? Consider omniworld. Again, three definitions come to my mind: 1) something that is all the worlds at the same time. 2) something that encompasses all the worlds. 3) something that can turn into any world imaginable. Omniworld is pretty much the same as omnishape but on a larger, more complex scale. Again, the first definition is absurd, whilst the latter two definitions are true. We can try omnibook or omnicolour and they will logically generate the same definitional pattern with the first being false (semantically inconsistent), and the latter two being true (semantically consistent).

For a concept to logically denote Existence in an absolute sense, it must denote Existence in the same way that the concepts of infinity and omnipresent do. Omnishape, omnibook, and other similar omni concepts, all logically fail to do this (unless you interpret their 2nd, and possibly 3rd definitions a certain way). Consider the following two omni concepts:

Omnibenevolent = that which is always benevolent to all beings

Omnimalevolent = that which is always malevolent to all beings

The moment x is benevolent, it is no longer hypothetically possible for him to be omnimalevolent; and the moment x is malevolent, it is no longer hypothetically possible for him to be omnibenevolent. Omnimalevolent is an absurd concept because it is impossible for x to truly want to be malevolent towards himself. If x wants to gouge out his own eyes, and commits to this, then he is doing what he wants to himself. He is giving himself what he wants. You cannot harm yourself against your will (you cannot will to not gouge out your own eyes but will it at the same time), but you can have your eyes gouged out by another. That just leaves us with omnibenevolence. If a woman is benevolent towards a man who harms her (despite her having the power to harm him, separate from him, or simply stop being benevolent towards him), then what is she in relation to herself? Benevolent or malevolent? If one wants to be harmed or suffer because they think they are evil and want to be good (why else would they willingly suffer), then are they being benevolent to themselves or malevolent? What is clear is that omnibenevolence is absurd when there is evil (the evil man makes it impossible for the woman to be benevolent to all), and pure omnimalevolence is absurd when one values good (it is impossible for one to be good towards evil when one values good). We are on the receiving end of neither. We can conceive of both better and worse things happening to us (being Heaven is better, being in Hell is worse). The terms “Heaven” and “Hell” are the absolutes regarding this matter (with Hell being that which no greater suffering/misery can be conceived of, and Heaven being that which no greater joy/happiness can be conceived of). Let’s try a different approach to these concepts:

Omnibenevolent = that which is always benevolent to all good beings

Omnimalevoelnt = that which is always malevolent to all evil beings

The above definitions are semantically consistent. Omnibenevolence is at its purest in Heaven, whilst omnimalevolence is at its purest in Hell. There is also all that is between Heaven and Hell.

We a posteriori believe that water in our world is made up of atoms. With this belief/semantic in mind, in order for water to be semi-omnipresent, atoms must also be equally (if not more) semi-omnipresent. In other words, in order for omniwater to be at all meaningful, omniatom must be true (because water is made up of atoms). And even if we talk about water that’s not made up of atoms, it’s still made up of whatever Existence is made up of (which is neither nothing nor water).

Logically, we need an item that is between any and every item except itself. That item is the infinitesimal. The infinitesimal separates all existing things from each other except itself. Nothing can separate one infinitesimal from another. If x is not separated from x by anything other than x, then x is just one x. x is Existence. If we say concepts such as omniatom denote atoms occupying all of Existence in an omnipresent manner, then we would be rejecting infinitesimal as that which everything is made up of or sustained by. Whilst metals, water, and every other imaginable thing is made up of infinitesimal, the reverse does not hold true. The infinitesimal cannot stop being infinitesimal, whereas water can cease to be water by changing into something else. Since the omnipresent itself cannot change (despite things it sustains being susceptible to change), this shows us that any semantic other than infinitesimal, will leave us with an absurd (semantically inconsistent) description of what Existence is made up of or refers to. 

Only that which is infinite is omnipresent. Infinitesimals are is omnipresent. Existence is omnipresent. It’s like in relation to us, infinity is the external aspect of Existence, whilst infinitesimal is the internal aspect of Existence. I am in Existence, but there is no non-Existence in me, and there is no end to the Existence in me or outside of me. Thus, I am in Existence (infinity), and Existence (infinitesimal) is in me. In other words, I am fully encompassed, sustained, and separated from other beings/things/existents, by Existence.

We’ve discussed omnibenevolence, omnimalevolence, and other omni concepts. An explanation was given with regards to how/why they are meaningful concepts. I will now focus on omnipotence and omniscience.

The omnis that logically denote Existence in an absolute manner

Omnipotent = that which can do all that is doable

Omniscient = that which knows all that is knowable

One cannot do all that is doable without having reach or access to all of Existence (if I have no reach or access to x, then I have no power over x). Just as I cannot count to infinity, I cannot expand to the point of infinity to replace that which is infinite. How is this replacement going to take place? Is the original Existence (or infinite being) going to go into non-Existence in order to make room for me to take its place?

Only the omnipresent has reach/access to all of Existence. Furthermore, nothing can take the place of Existence, or become Existence, because nothing can become omnipresent from a non-omnipresent state (just as nothing can become infinite from a non-infinite state). This shows that one cannot be omnipotent without being omnipresent. Similarly, one cannot know all that is knowable without being omnipresent. How can one store or be in possession of an endless amount of data, knowledge, or hypothetical possibilities, without being infinite? Also, how can one know what it’s like to be omnipotent without being omnipresent? One cannot.

The previous two paragraphs show that omnipotence and omniscience logically can’t be attributes of anything other than the infinite, or the omnipresent (Existence). So whilst semantics such as ‘unicorn’ or ‘me choosing to do psychology instead of philosophy in 2009’ can all be said to be meaningful as a result of being hypothetical possibilities or time sensitive hypothetical possibilities, omnipotence and omniscience cannot be accounted for in the same way. This is because nothing can become omnipresent from a non-omnipresent state. With the previous paragraph in mind, this logically means that nothing can become omnipotent/omniscient from a non-omnipotent/non-omniscient state. Also, that which is omnipresent cannot magically shift from being non-omnipotent/non-omniscient to being omnipotent/omniscient as that would be a case of something coming from nothing. Where would Existence (the omnipresent) have found the potential to be omniscient from if it was non-omniscient? Non-Existence?

If the omnipresent is not omnipotent, then omnipotence is hypothetically impossible (as is omniscience). Therefore, either Existence is necessarily omnipotent and omniscient (which is the only way we can meaningfully account for how omnipotence and omniscience are meaningful), or, Existence is necessarily non-omnipotent/non-omniscient (which means omnipotence and omniscience are absurd concepts (like roundsquares). It’s not just a matter of hypothetical possibility or time sensitive hypothetical possibility. Where omnipotence and omniscience are meaningful/rational (semantically consistent) concepts, they must be true of Existence in an absolute sense. If they are true of Existence in an absolute sense, then an omnipotent/omniscient being is as at least as real as we are.

Some might argue that naturalism is a meaningful concept. Since it is a meaningful concept, it is true of Existence. If concept A is the negation of another concept B from Existence as a whole, then A is a contradictory concept provided that B is a meaningful concept. On the other hand, if B is absurd/contradictory (semantically inconsistent), then A is meaningful. For example, non-naturalism (the negation of naturalism) is true if naturalism is contradictory, and vice versa.

Consider finitism. The finitist will argue that Existence is finite (just as the naturalist will argue that Existence is non-omnipotent/non-omniscient). If the finitist is to be rationally/semantically consistent and avoid the problem of something coming from nothing, he will argue that infinity is absurd, therefore, Existence is necessarily finite. Similarly, if the naturalist is to be rationally consistent and avoid the problem of something coming from nothing, he will argue that omnipotence and omniscience are contradictory/absurd, therefore, Existence is necessarily non-omnipotent/non-omniscient. Finitism is purely a product of the negation of infinity. Since infinity is not a contradictory concept, finitism is a contradictory concept. Similarly, naturalism is purely a product of the negation of some divine attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience. If omnipotence and omniscience are not contradictory (which the ontological argument shows that they cannot be), then naturalism is a contradictory concept.

Finitism leaves us without an explanation for why infinity is meaningful. Naturalism leaves us without an explanation for why omnipotence and omniscience are meaningful. It is important to note that just as infinity is not the negation of finitism (although this is a logical consequence of it being meaningful but not its actual meaning), omnipotence and omniscience are also not the negation of naturalism (despite this being a logical consequence of them being meaningful but not their actual meanings). Nihilism, finitism, and naturalism, are all purely negations of other meaningful concepts. Infinity does not deny the meaningfulness of finite. It denies finiteness as being all there is to Existence by virtue of itself being meaningful. Similarly, omnipotence and omniscience do not deny the meaningfulness of there being natural laws in Existence. They deny natural laws as being all there is to Existence by virtue of themselves being meaningful.

Perfection

The final concept to consider when reflecting on the nature of Existence, is perfection. Perfection = that which no greater than can be conceived of, or that which cannot get any better. There is that which is truly perfect, and there is that which we wrongly label as perfect. For example, the phrase “perfect human” is absurd because the best possible human is not that which no greater than can be conceived of. How can the best possible human be considered as perfect when better than it can be conceived? This shows that phrases such as “the perfect human”, amount to absurdly saying the perfect imperfect being. This is no different to absurdly saying the omnipresent non-omnipresent being. A perfect triangle, is truly/perfectly triangular. That which is truly perfect, is truly perfect.

It is more appropriate to label that which is truly perfect as perfect, and to label that which is “perfect” but not truly perfect, as semi-perfect (the best that it can be in relation to its non-perfect self or context). There was an a priori answer to what is omnipresent. Is there an a priori answer to what is perfect?

Objectively, which is better: Existence being the best that it can be, or, Existence not being as good as it can be? If I wanted to be as good as I can be, and, make sure everyone gets what they truly/perfectly deserve (including myself), would I not need to be omnipotent and omniscient? What would make one happier, more fulfilled, and more in awe of its own existing/being? Being perfect (a perfect Existence), or an imperfect Existence?

Whatever world or being you give me, it can be made better by being/existing in a perfect Existence (of course, the only exception to this is the perfect Existence itself because it cannot be/exist any better). The “perfect” life that you want in the “perfect” galaxy, is made better by being/existing in a perfect Existence. Do you want your book, life, or galaxy to be/exist in a perfect Existence (where everyone gets what they truly deserve), or an imperfect one? Thus, your “perfect” life is not perfect if it is/exists in an imperfect Existence because it can be made better by being in a perfect Existence. If your “reasoning” is such that you prefer to be in an imperfect Existence instead of a perfect Existence, then you are evil/irrational/inconsistent. Only evil people favour an Existence with injustice over an Existence with no injustice. Only irrational people think maximum, consistent, meaningful, fulfilling happiness can be possible in an imperfect Existence.

Clearly, the greatest potentiality in terms of goodness, lies within a perfect Existence. Any lesser being such as a galaxy or a human, cannot be as good as Existence. Just as there can be nothing more present than an omnipresent being (Existence), there can be nothing better than a perfect being (Existence). Therefore, just as only Existence can semantically qualify as being omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and infinite, only Existence can semantically qualify as being perfect. How can something be perfect if it is not omnipotent? And how can something be omnipotent if it is not infinite/Existence/omnipresent? Most importantly, how can something be perfect if Existence is imperfect? How can anything exist perfectly in an imperfect existence? It cannot. That which is truly perfect, is perfectly true (there is not greater truth than ‘Existence is perfect’).

Is perfection like infinity, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient, in that it is at least as real as we are? Perfection cannot logically denote anything other than the omnipresent. In other words, if perfection is not omnipresent, then it’s not perfect/perfection because better than it can be conceived.

One might ask: What if Existence’s desires were evil or amoral? 

We can account for the meaningfulness of the concepts of imperfect and evil, because there are imperfect and evil beings. How do we account for the meaningfulness of the concept of perfect?

For perfection to be meaningful, it must at least be a hypothetical possibility. That which has imperfect desires, or even the slightest bit of potential for an imperfect desire, is not perfect. If Existence ever had imperfect desires, or, if it had even the slightest bit of potential for an imperfect desire, then perfection would be hypothetically impossible. Therefore, Existence’s desires being evil or amoral, cannot be true. This proves that Existence being perfect, is guaranteed. Perhaps it is hypothetically possible for Existence to to do imperfectly, just as it is hypothetically possible for me to gauge out my own eyes. This is not true. With Existence it’s certainly guaranteed to never happen (doing imperfectly). With me, it’s almost certainly guaranteed to never happen (gouging out my own eyes). I can think of extremely wild and unlikely hypothetical scenarios where I might gauge out my own eyes, but I cannot think of any hypothetical scenario where Existence would go against its own perfect desires to compromise its own perfection. It is omniscient, so it can’t miscalculate or do mistakenly. Its desires cannot shift from being perfect to imperfect because it doesn’t have any potential for an imperfect desire (if it did, then by definition it wouldn’t be perfect). So how can it possibly do imperfectly? Having said that, I can conceive of Jesus being crucified. How do I reconcile this rationally?

I suppose I should say Existence can do imperfectly, but won’t do imperfectly. But can I really/truly conceive of Jesus being crucified when the premises I have are ‘Jesus is righteous’ and ‘Existence is perfect’? Surely if I see Jesus being crucified I must either conclude Existence is imperfect, or that Jesus is not as righteous as he should be (unless he enjoys being crucified and no harm comes from it). I cannot hold onto both premises at the same time. It would be like believing in the imperfect perfect existence, or the married bachelor, or the round square. So which premise do I hold onto?

I can think of extremely wild and unlikely hypothetical scenarios where Jesus might want to be crucified, or that crucification might be good for him, or that he is simply insufficient in his righteousness, or all three of the aforementioned. But I cannot think of any hypothetical scenario where Existence would go against Its own perfect desires to compromise Its own perfection. Again, it is omniscient so It can’t miscalculate or do mistakenly. Its desires cannot shift from being perfect to imperfect. So how can it possibly do/will imperfectly (or be imperfect)?

Clearly, Existence won’t do imperfectly. Can we say Existence can’t do imperfectly? If Existence (the omniscient and omnipotent) wanted to crucify a truly righteous woman, it could because it is omnipotent. It is impossible for Existence to want this because it is perfect (hence the impossibility of such an occurrence). Thus, the omnipresent cannot become non-omnipresent, and the perfect will not will imperfectly or become imperfect. It can be said with certainty that the perfect being is at least as real as we are. In my next post, I will discuss why it looks as though there is evil and injustice in Existence (though I do not deny that there are evil and unjust beings in Existence).

In my previous post I asked “do we have rational authority to say our Donal Trump can fly? Could there be premises in place that render such a thing as absurd?” The only premise that can render this as being absurd, is that it would amount to objective or absolute imperfection (an imperfect Existence). Where it does not amount to absolute imperfection, then it is clearly hypothetically possible for Existence to grant our Donald Trump the ability to fly (provided that it hasn’t already). This also holds true for me being able to raise my arm in the next second. So long as it doesn’t contradict perfection (the will of God shall we say), it’s hypothetically possible.

Just as triangles can’t be anything other than three-sided, Existence can’t refer to anything other than God/Perfection (infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent towards good, omnimalevolent towards evil).